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Schröder for having shared the Job Market experience with me.
Finally, but most specially, I will always keep in my heart all the people that ac-
companied me in this journey and will always be on my side. Thanks Amanda,
Francesco, Gerdis, Stefania e Silvia, Paolo, Giulia e Fernando, Cristina, Silvia, Julia
and Alessia. I am aware I got you through a not-so-easy ride, but I enjoyed every
single second of it.
viii
Abstract of Thesis
This thesis discusses potential motivations behind unhealthy or unethical behaviour.
With the experimental method and drawing on insights from behavioural economics,
it identifies features of the decision making process which enhance the appearance
of unethical or unhealthy behaviour. The aim is that of informing policy makers or
future interventions on the ways to improve these behaviours.
The first chapter “Groups and Socially Responsible Production: An Experiment
with Farmers”, is about the main drivers of entrepreneurs’ social responsibility. With
a lab in the field experiment with farmers in Italy, I study how and whether group
decision making affects the social responsibility and the ethicality of production
choices. Does corporate social responsibility decrease when corporate decisions are
taken by several people (a corporate board) instead of an individual entrepreneur?
And if so, why? I ask to 126 farmers in Tuscany to choose between an ecological
and non-ecological but more profitable product to use in their farm. To study the
effect of collective decision making, I introduce two experimental variations in a 2x2
design: (i) the number of people responsible for the decision (one vs three) and (ii)
the number of people receiving a payoff from the decision (one vs three). I find
that collective payoff leads to less socially responsible decisions, possibly because it
provides them with the moral wiggle room to be less pro-social. On the other hand,
ix
sharing the responsibility of the decision with others does not change behaviour in
this setting, meaning that there is no diffusion of responsibility, in contrast to what
has been found in laboratory experiments. To shed light on the external validity of
my results, I find that my experimental measure of social responsibility correlates
with measures of social responsibility outside the lab.
The second chapter “Rewarding with a food makes that food more appealing”,
studies with a field experiment the impact of using a food as reward. The chapter
is joint work with Jan Michael Bauer, Michèle Belot and Marina Schröder. Parents
often use sweet and calorie dense foods to reward their children. We hypothesize that
such practices may contribute to the formation of unhealthy food preferences. To
test this hypothesis, we conducted a randomized field experiment with 214 children
in 3 schools in Germany. In the treatment classes, children were asked to complete
a cognitive task in 6 visits over 3 weeks, and received dried apples as a reward. The
task consisted of counting a number of random dots in several different pictures. In
the control group classes, children received the dried apple unconditionally. Receiv-
ing the food for solving the tasks might provoke a positive association of the food
with the positive feeling of achievement. It could also be that having to provide effort
to obtain a food enhances the value of that food. We split the treatment groups into
two, varying the number of pictures between the two treatment groups. This allows
us to identify the role of effort in driving a change in preference for dried apple. Our
results show that rewarding children with food does increase their liking for the food
reward. Also, increasing the effort required to obtain the reward does not impact the
liking. These findings suggest that parents and carers should avoid using unhealthy
food as rewards and may even use this mechanism to increase the liking of healthy
food by using such foods as rewards.
x
The third chapter, “Stress and Food Preferences: A Lab Experiment with Low
Income Mothers”, discusses the influence of stress on food preferences. Jointly with
Michèle Belot, Jonathan James and Nicolai Vitt, we conduct a lab experiment with
196 low-income mothers in the UK to study the impact of acute stress on immediate
and planned food choices. We propose two channels through which stress might
affect food choices: (i) by affecting individuals’ preferences and (ii) by affecting their
ability to make sound decisions. With a novel incentivised stress task designed to
mimic stressors often experienced by mothers from a low socio-economic status, we
experimentally induce acute stress on a group of participants. We take measurements
of participants’ salivary cortisol and heart rate over the course of the experimental
sessions to assess the stressfulness of the stress task. Afterwards, we ask them to
purchase food items in a ”virtual supermarket” and also we offer them high-and low-
calorie snacks. We use the nutritional content of the chosen food-shopping basket and
the quantity of snacks consumed to determine the impact of acute stress on planned
and immediate food consumption choices, respectively. Contrary to previous findings




Individuals often take decisions that are less than healthy and responsible with re-
spect to the environment. In some cases, subjects take these decisions wilfully,
comparing costs and benefits in health or for society and the personal utility of their
actions. In other cases, biases and factors contingent on the choice lead them to take
these unhealthy or unethical decisions. In this thesis, I study potential motivations
behind unhealthy and unethical behaviour providing experimental evidence from the
laboratory and the field, with the intent of identifying tools to improve them.
The first chapter “Groups and Socially Responsible Production: An Experiment
with Farmers”, studies the main drivers of entrepreneurs’ social responsibility. Here
I investigate how decisions made by board of directors in the interest of multiple
stakeholders are different from decisions made by single individuals for own profits.
In particular, I separate the effect of two dimensions of group decision making on
social responsibility: i) sharing the responsibility of the decision with multiple people
and ii) sharing the profits and the benefits of the decision with multiple people. If
behaving unethically bears a cost, sharing the responsibility of the decision might
diffuse the cost of taking the non-socially responsible action. Sharing the benefits
of the decision might allow participants to take the non-socially responsible choice
disregarding the social cost, in the interest of their group. To study this, I ask 126
xii
Italian farmers to choose between a pair of ecological working gloves and a pair of
non-ecological working gloves for their farm, where the non-ecological working gloves
allow them to also receive an amount of money. Each farmer takes his decision either
individually for own profits, or by majority with other subjects, or with benefits and
payoff for the group. I find that sharing the responsibility of the decision does not
modify choices. Sharing the benefits of behaving unethically instead leads to less
socially responsible choices, by allowing farmers to take the non-socially responsible
and more profitable choice in the interest of the group.
The next two chapters are in the area of behavioural health economics. In chap-
ter 2 “Rewarding with a food makes that food more appealing” I study, jointly with
Jan Michael Bauer, Michèle Belot and Marina Schröder, the impact of rewarding
with food on its liking. In our culture sweets are frequently presented in a positive
social-affective context: they are present at parties, at holiday celebrations such as
Christmas and Easter, they are used as reward and reinforcer of good behaviours.
Using food to reward effort might increase its evaluation either to justify the effort
exerted to obtain the reward or because of the association of the food with the feeling
of being rewarded. For these reasons, one may worry that these practices might be
exacerbating the rise in obesity and unhealthy eating: using treats might be increas-
ing their valuation influencing formation of the ”sweet tooth” and contributing to
the obesity epidemic. We study this in a field experiment with 214 first graders in
Germany, where we offer children a dried apple as a reward for completing an effort
task. We find that rewarding children with food increases their liking for the food
reward. We also explore whether is the effort to obtain the food-reward to induce
higher liking, modifying the effort required to obtain the dried apple. We find that
exerting more effort does not impact the liking of the food reward, suggesting that
xiii
the positive association of the dried apple with the feeling of accomplishment is the
main driver of the effect. These findings suggest that the common practice of using
(typically high in calorie) foods as rewards may contribute to their appeal. Parent
and child carer should then either abstain from this practise or use healthier foods
to reward their children, to promote their liking.
Chapter 3 “Stress and Food Preferences: A Lab Experiment with Low Income
Mothers” is on stress and its impact on immediate and planned consumption choices.
Jointly with Michèle Belot, Jonathan James and Nicolai Vitt, we conduct a labora-
tory study in Essex with 196 mothers from a low socio-economic background. We
induce stress with an incentivized decision task, tailored to mimic stressors usually
experienced by low socio economics mothers, and measure it with a questionnaire and
collecting several biomarkers (salivary cortisol and testosterone, hear-rate variabil-
ity). Afterwards, we ask these mothers to do their weekly food and drinks shopping
with a £30 budget from a ”virtual supermarket”. We also offer them high-and low-
calorie snacks. We use the nutritional content of the chosen food-shopping basket
and the quantity of snacks consumed to determine the impact of acute stress on
planned (in the virtual supermarket) and immediate (consumption of the two snacks
offered) food consumption choices. Contrary to previous findings in the literature,
we do not find evidence of an effect of acute stress on immediate or planned food
choices.
xiv
Chapter 1. Groups and Socially
Responsible Production: An
Experiment with Farmers
Does corporate social responsibility decrease when corporate decisions are taken by
several people (a corporate board) instead of an individual entrepreneur? And if so,
why? I study these questions in a lab-in the field experiment involving 126 Italian
farmers. They are asked to choose between an ecological and non-ecological but more
profitable product to use in their farm. To study the effect of collective decision
making, I introduce two experimental variations in a 2x2 design: (i) the number
of people responsible for the decision (one vs three) and (ii) the number of people
receiving a payoff from the decision (one vs three). I find that collective payoff leads
to less socially responsible decisions, possibly because it provides participants with the
moral wiggle room to be less pro-social. On the other hand, sharing the responsibility
of the decision with others does not change behaviour in this setting, meaning that
there is no diffusion of responsibility, in contrast to what has been found in other
laboratory experiments. To shed light on the external validity of my results, I find
that my experimental measure of social responsibility correlates with measures of
Martina Vecchi
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social responsibility outside the lab.
1.1 Introduction
The interest in corporate social responsibility (SR1) and consumers’ willingness to
pay for the socially responsible quality of products has been on a rise in recent years.
The media often report corporate scandals and ethical failures. For example in 2015
Volkswagen admitted cheating emissions tests, after the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) found that many VW cars being sold in America had a “defeat de-
vice” to detect when their diesel engine was being tested [16].What are the main
drivers drivers of entrepreneurs’ social responsibility? By understanding the impact
of different factors, we could foster the internalization of the costs for the society of
non-socially responsible actions.
The first contribution of this chapter is to separate the relative impact of two
different dimensions of group on social responsibility of choices with a single experi-
ment: (i) the number of people responsible for the decision (one vs three) and (ii) the
number of people receiving the payoff and benefits from the decision (one vs three). I
also separate three possible forces (i) diffusion of responsibility (ii) ingroup bias and
(iii) self-serving altruism. I find that payoff commonality reduces social responsibil-
ity and increases the focus on payoff by creating the moral wiggle room for subjects
to feel socially responsible while acting unethically “in the interest of the ingroup”
(self-serving altruism). I do not find evidence that deciding with other subjects by
majority diffuses responsibility and has an impact on social responsibility of choices.
1Depending on context, I define SR as both “socially responsible” and “social responsibility”.
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The second contribution is to study producers’ social responsibility with actual
producers. With a framed-field experiment (FFE) with 126 agricultural producers
in Italy, members of one of the main unions of Italian farmers (CIA, Confederazione
Italiana Agricoltori), I study farmers’ attitudes towards purchasing a socially respon-
sible product for their farm. With a 2x2 design, I separate the importance of sharing
responsibility for the decision and payoff commonality. I ask producers to choose
between a pair of ecological working gloves for their farm, the socially responsible
product, and a pair of non-ecological working gloves which allow them to addition-
ally earn a sum of money. They take the choice either individually (in the ‘I - I’ and
‘I - C’ treatments) or collectively by majority with two other people (in the ‘C - I’
and ‘C - C’ treatments)2. Furthermore, the benefits and the payoff can be individual
for the participant deciding (in the ‘I - I’ and ‘C - I’ treatments) or for the group (in
the ‘I - C’ and ‘C - C’ treatments). In this experiment, if the payoff is for the group,
it is not shared among people but each subject receives the same payoff.
If taking a non-socially responsible decision bears a cost, collective decision making
might diffuse responsibility for the choice and share the cost of acting non-responsibly
among decision makers, leading to lower social responsibility [52, 46, 72]. I do not
find evidence for diffusion of responsibility.
I find instead that payoff commonality reduces social responsibility and increases the
focus on payoff. With payoff commonality, being responsible for stakeholders’ payoff
might lead the decision maker to maximize the payoff of the ingroup disregarding
the social cost, showing ingroup bias and lowering social responsibility [43, 7]. Payoff
commonality might also allow the decision maker to justify non socially responsible
actions with self-serving altruism: deciding for the payoff of the group, not only
2The four treatments are ‘I - I’, ‘I - C’,‘C - I’ and ‘C - C’, where the first letter refers to the
decision maker (individual decision I vs collective decision C) and the second letter refers to who
receives the payoff (individual payoff I vs collective payoff C).
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for own payoff but also group-mates’ payoff, might allow subjects to feel socially
responsible while choosing the economic profit “in the interest of the group-mates”.
Payoff commonality might create the moral wiggle room for subjects to act selfishly
while keeping their socially responsible image [6, 39]. To investigate these two hy-
pothesis about payoff commonality, I also collect farmers’ decision about the payoff
of a group-mate (only). If subjects show ingroup bias, they care about group-mates’
payoff and maximize group-mates payoff also when their payoff is not affected. If
subjects show self-serving altruism in contrast, they maximize group-mates payoff
solely when their own payoff is also affected by the decision, i.e. when deciding for
their own and group-mates payoff (under payoff commonality) but not when deciding
only for a group-mate. I find that payoff commonality reduces social responsibility
by creating the moral wiggle room for subjects to feel socially responsible while act-
ing non-responsibly “in the interest of the ingroup” (self-serving altruism).
Both consumers and producers often face ethical dilemmas that involve a trade-
off between a low payoff (high cost) without negative externalities or a higher payoff
(lower cost) with negative externalities. Consumers’ attitudes towards socially re-
sponsible products have been studied both in the lab with consumers (students and
different populations) and outside the lab [50, 28, 69]. The attitude of producers
and its determinants has instead been mainly overlooked, considered as a response
to consumers’ demand for social responsibility [12, 47] or only studied in the context
of a trade in the laboratory between students. Enhancing the credibility and the
transparency of labels, signalling socially responsible production, increases the price
consumers are willing to pay [60, 32, 37]. The scope of the externality (whether the
party affected by the negative externality is a single third party or several subjects)
has just a small effect [9].
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Several studies have shown how student and non-student samples behave differ-
ently in experiments.3 People seem to display lower moral reasoning when responding
to work related dilemmas compared to non-work dilemmas and subjects with differ-
ent roles in an organization have different behaviours [70, 71]. Treviño et al. [68] find
that managers and partners in public accounting firms have lower moral reasoning
scores than those at lower organizational levels in the firm. Elm and Nichols [30] find
similar results in a more general management sample, where longer tenured managers
show lower moral judgment scores. The causal link between whether people with
different levels of moral reasoning select themselves into different roles, or whether
the work environment defines moral judgment [67] is unclear. However, production
decisions taken by non-producers could be unrealistic and lead to different choices.
Framed field experiments (FFE) could help solve the problem of the “non repre-
sentativeness” of a student (consumers) sample when taking decisions about social
responsibility in production [55, 53]. FFE are lab experiments with a non-standard
subject pool and a field context in the commodity and task used [40], are a step that
progresses from experiments in the lab toward the environment of interest [55, 53],
allowing us to learn the influence of different factors on the behaviour of specific
populations or in specific situations. Abstracting from the context, we do indeed
lose the ability to replicate shared norms and group identity (i.e. as producers) [42],
and the representation of the commodity by the subject is an integral part of how
he solves a task. By using a FFE with producers, I am able to study social respon-
sibility with subjects accustomed to taking this type of decisions for their company,
3Miller et al. [58] and Cappelen et al. [19] invited standard and non-standard (non-students)
subject pools to the lab to play classic experimental games and strategical games (in Miller et al. [58]
both groups are inexperienced). The authors find analogous comparative statics, but substantial
differences in the behaviour of the two subject pools with respect to other-regarding preferences
(students display lower other-regarding concerns). In studies of ethical behaviour, the use of non-
standard subject pools is likely to lead to different results.
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and who know the importance of profit and being socially responsible in business. In
addition, it allows me to ask producers about selecting and receiving a commodity
they will use for their business, the ecological or non ecological working gloves. Fi-
nally, surveying entrepreneurs offers a chance to link socially responsible behaviour
(in an individual donation decision they take during the experiment mainly, but also
in the product decision) to the characteristics of their company. This allows me to
check the external validity of the effect of payoff commonality and collective deci-
sion making on socially responsible choices. Despite the fact that outside the lab the
number of people who share profits and decision making power with the farmer is not
randomly assigned, it is interesting to analyse the link between social responsibility,
the number of employees (who have “payoff commonality” with the entrepreneur)
and the number of subjects with decision-making power in the farm.
This chapter also relates to the literature on group decision making. While the
impact of the two dimensions of collective decision making and collective payoff
has never been disentangled, group behaviour has been studied broadly, also in the
“ethical” domain. Groups often behave differently from individuals. In the domain
of socially responsible behaviour, studies show that decisions taken with a partner
about common payoff (two people are needed to complete the trade of an unethi-
cal product) lead to more unethical choices [35, 46, 45]. In games, groups usually
behave more closely to the equilibrium and learn better [56, 15]. They are better
at coordinating [38] but reach a lower level of social welfare when trust is crucial to
achieve it. Moreover, groups show lower altruism concerns (towards the outgroup
members) and have higher concerns for maximizing the group’s joint payoff [22] (see
Charness and Sutter [23] for a review). The review by Kugler et al. [51] shows that
in interacting tasks (strategic situations) groups are more rational, competitive and
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oriented towards payoff-maximisation. In non-strategic situations, groups usually
exhibit weaker biases than individuals.4
The next section introduces the sample of this experiment; sections 1.2.2 and
1.2.3 outline the hypotheses and the experiment design; section 1.2.2 describes the
purchase decision and the hypotheses related to groups’ decisions, 1.2.3 describes the
donation decision and the survey. Section 1.3 outlines the hypotheses and predictions
of the experiment. Section 1.4 presents the results of the study, showing both the
non-parametric statistics and the regression analysis.
1.2 Experimental Design
To study producers’ behaviour, I run a framed field experiments with 126 Tuscan
farmers, associates of the Confederazione Italiana Agricoltori (CIA, Italian Farmers
Confederation).5
1.2.1 Sample and Recruitment Procedure
I contacted the Tuscan CIA via email, inviting them to collaborate on a project
aimed at understanding entrepreneurial choices. In meetings with the general di-
rector and the vice-president of the CIA Tuscany, I gave general information about
the research (mainly information about the collaboration and the help needed from
the association). The project was presented to the regional CIA presidents by the
general director and the vice-president with a leaflet describing the aim of the study,
but not containing details about the research question (Appendix 1.5.2, figure 1.5.1).
4For example, groups exhibit lower overconfidence bias [66] and make fewer errors in risky choices
[20, 33].
5Ethical approval to conduct the study was obtained from the Ethics Sub-Committee of the
School of Economics of The University of Edinburgh.
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The experiment was run during the local and regional assemblies of CIA Firenze,
Arezzo, Siena, Massa Carrara and Grosseto. Information about the union is in Ap-
pendix 1.5.1.
At the beginning or at the end of the assembly, depending on the time of day and
the needs of the CIA president and directors, the president of the province would
introduce the study and invite attendees to participate. On average, 90% of the as-
sembly participants agreed to take part in the study. The number of participants in
each session was between 6 and 19, with 126 participants in total. I ran 12 sessions
in total: 8 in Florence, 1 in Arezzo, 1 in Massa Carrara, 1 in Grosseto and 1 in Siena.
The experiment was run pen and paper, in the same room as the assembly. Partic-
ipants were given a paper questionnaire with the informed consent form (Appendix
1.5.2, figure 1.5.2) and the instructions of the experiment, which was structured in
3 parts. A translated version of the instructions is in Appendix 1.5.6. The informed
consent and introduction were read out loud, sessions lasted between 30 to 45 min-
utes. Answers were then matched in a separate room and any potential earning was
put in an envelope with the ID of the participant, to pick up before leaving the
meeting. In each session I ran multiple treatments, placing at least 2 to 4 people
to treatments requiring collective decision making or sharing payoff.6 Each partici-
pant was assigned to a different treatment, with a between subject design with the
exception of the decision about the group-mate, which was a within subject decision.
1.2.2 Product Decision
Producers have the opportunity to take a decision about receiving a product for
their farm and earn a sum of money. The choice is between receiving (i) a pair
6Despite trying to avoid creating groups with a number different from 3 subjects, it was impos-
sible to forbid people to leave meetings after receiving the paper questionnaire, hence after being
assigned to treatments.
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of ecological working gloves or (ii) a pair of non-ecological working gloves plus a
monetary bonus. The ecological working gloves are the socially responsible option
(SR), participants know they are made from sustainable and recyclable bamboo
and produced in sweat-free plants. The non-ecological working gloves are the non
socially responsible but profitable option (NonSR), since they allow them receiving
a monetary bonus. Participants know they are made in non recyclable nylon and
no information is given about production. Participants also know the two pairs
of gloves have similar market prices (around 15 euro), fulfil the same function and
have the same characteristics. Decisions are elicited in a price list, with subjects
taking 10 different decisions with a varying bonus for selecting the non-ecological
gloves. The non-ecological gloves (NonSR) allow the farmer (or his group, if the
treatment implements payoff commonality) to receive a sum of money (bonus) that
varies in the 10 different choices faced. The bonus varies in steps of 2 euro, from 2
to 20 euro. If subjects care about social responsibility (and the socially responsible
quality of goods), choosing the non-ecological gloves gives them a disutility from
producing the negative externality but allows them to receive a varying monetary
amount. Subjects know that one of the 10 decisions will be randomly drawn and
implemented, if they are selected in this part. For 2/3 of subjects none of their
choices about their own payoff is implemented in this part, their decision is though
implemented in the donation decision. An example of the decision pairs for the ‘I
- I’ treatment, with individual decision and individual payoff, is displayed in figure
1.2.1.
I define the willingness to pay for the socially responsible quality of the good (WtpSR)
as the highest monetary amount subjects are willing to forgo to “purchase” ecological
gloves (subjects still prefer receiving socially responsible gloves than non socially
responsible gloves plus the amount of money offered). The lower the switch-point,
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the less a subject cares about the socially responsible quality of the good and hence
























Figure 1.2.1: Decision pairs for the ‘I - I’ Treatment.
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Treatments
In a 2x2 design I ask producers to take the decision about the product, varying the
number of decision makers (individual decision vs collective decision of the group
by majority) and the number of people receiving the benefits and the payoff of the
decision (gloves and bonus for the individual vs gloves and bonus for the 3 group-
mates).




Individual I - I C - I & Group-mate
Collective I - C C - C
Choices are taken individually by each subject, pen and paper. If treatments
implement individual decision making, the decision of the subject is implemented. If
they implement collective decision making, the final choice is the one selected by the
majority. There is no communication between group members and full anonymity
of choices. With respect to payoff, in case of individual payoff the subject receives
a pair of the chosen gloves and the additional bonus corresponding to the decision
selected for payment. With collective payoff, each subject in the group receives a
pair of the chosen gloves and the bonus associated with the decision selected for
payment. Each subject receives the bonus and a pair of the gloves, to keep the
negative externality and the gain from the decision constant for each subject. By
doing this, I keep constant across treatments the individual trade-off between being
socially responsible and monetary amount (for each choice pair). For example, in
decision pair 5 for 10 euro (figure 1.2.1), the treatments ‘I - I’ and ‘C - I’ offer a
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choice between 1 pair of SR gloves or 1 pair of non SR gloves and 10 euro. The
corresponding decision in treatments ‘I - C’ and ‘C - C’ offers a choice between 1
pair of SR gloves or 1 pair of non SR gloves plus 10 euro, for the subject himself and
for two other subjects. Table 1.2.2 shows the decision a subject faces in decision pair
5 in all the treatments.
If subjects assigned to a group treatment leave after the assignment to treatment, I
form groups of either 2 or 4 participants. In case of collective payoff, the same payoff
is given to 2 or 4 members, instead of 3. In case of collective decision making, the
choice of the selected participant applies only to one other subject instead of 2.
Table 1.2.2: Decision pair 10
Treatment Socially responsible + 0 e Non Socially responsible + 10 e
I - I 1 ecological gloves + 0 e 1 non-ecological gloves + 10 e
C - I a 1 ecological gloves + 0 e 1 non-ecological gloves + 10 e
I - C b 3 ecological gloves + 0 e 3 non-ecological gloves + 30 e
C - C a,b 3 ecological gloves + 0 e 3 non-ecological gloves + 30 e
a Decisions taken by majority with 2 other team-members.
b 1 pair of gloves for each team member and 10 euro for each team member.
The product decision is implemented for a randomly selected subgroup of partic-
ipants, those not selected in this part are selected in a second part of the experiment
(donation decision). If selected, of the 10 decision pairs 1 is chosen at random and
the participant (and his group, if the treatment implements collective payoff) re-
ceives the chosen gloves and any monetary payment.
Every participant takes the 10 decisions related to the treatment he is assigned to,
and then I implement and pay the decision of 1/3 of participants. In the ‘I - I’ treat-
ment, every subject decides what to receive between ecological or non-ecological
13
working gloves plus the monetary bonus. Only 1 every 3 subjects will then receive
what he choose in the randomly selected decision pair. In the ‘C - C’ treatment, each
group decides by majority between ecological or non-ecological gloves plus monetary
bonus. Only 1 every 3 groups will then receive what chosen in the randomly selected
decision pair. In the ‘I - C’ treatment, each subject decides for himself and for his 2
group-mates between ecological or non-ecological gloves plus monetary bonus. Only
1 of the 3 subjects in the group will then be selected and be the decision maker. The
group will receive what was chosen by the decision maker in the randomly selected
decision pair. In the ‘C - I’ treatment, each subject decides for himself between eco-
logical or non-ecological gloves plus monetary bonus. Here, each subject takes the
decision for his payoff, knowing his payoff is going to be determined by his decision
and also the decision of his 2 group-mates about his payoff. Then, only 1 of the 3
subjects in the group will be selected to be the one receiving the payoff (‘receiver’).
The ‘receiver’ will get what was chosen by his group in the decision pair randomly
selected. In ‘C - I’, each subject is also asked a second decision for one of his group-
mates. The decision is what he wants his group-mate to receive between ecological
or non-ecological gloves plus monetary bonus. In case the subject is not selected to
be the one receiving the payoff, this second decision will be implemented to deter-
mine by majority the payoff of the ‘receiver’. I use this within subject decision to
compare the social responsibility of farmers when deciding (also) for themselves and
when deciding (only) for another subject. Figure 1.2.2 shows the decisions in the
four treatments.
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Figure 1.2.2: Decision Making Assignment
1.2.3 Donation Decision and Survey
To have a baseline of social responsibility and study the correlation between social
responsibility in the lab and the two dimension of (i) number of decision makers and
(ii) the number of stakeholders outside the lab, I ask farmers to make an individual
donation decision and I collect several characteristics of their farm via a survey.
I collect individual donation decisions in a choice list setting. I use this decision to
control for heterogeneity in preferences for “being socially responsible”, and I also
correlate it with subjects’ business characteristics. Similarly to Kirchler et al. [46],
subjects decide about the varying monetary payment (which mimics the utility gain
from buying a good) at the cost of creating a negative externality to an uninvolved
third party in the choice list setting. The negative externality is created when de-
ciding to not donate to a non-governmental organization and keep the money. I
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mantain the negative externality of keeping the money constant at 5 euro, which
allows me to study the subjective cost of behaving non socially-responsibly. Farmers
take an individual choice between 2 alternative outcomes, in a list of 15 decision
pairs. Each of the 15 decisions is between getting a payoff ranging from 0 euro to
28 euro for themselves, increasing in steps of 2 euro, and a donation of 5 euro to
ASeS (Agricoltori Solidarietà e Sviluppo, farmers solidarity and development).7 I
randomly draw and pay one of the 15 decision pairs for 2/3 of subjects, those not
selected in the product decision. An example of the decision pairs for this part is
shown in figure 1.2.3. I define the willingness to pay for the donation (WtpD) as the
highest monetary amount the farmer is willing to forego to give 5 euro to ASeS.
7ASeS is the non-governmental organization (NGO) supported by the CIA, whose mission is
to support rural communities in developing countries by developing their agricultural capacities,







      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 2 :  X)  2 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 3 :  X)  4 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 4 :  X)  6 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 5 :  X)  8 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 6 :  X)  10 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 7 :  X)  12 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
 
Figure 1.2.3: Donation Decision Pairs
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I also ask farmers to fill in the survey in Appendix 1.5.6, part 1.5.13. The survey
contains firstly questions about the farm: how long has their farm has been in
business for (years in business), number of people taking decisions in the farm (n. of
decision makers), number of employees, yearly revenues, presence of any certifications
(organic, locally produced) and whether they purchase organic goods for production.
Secondly, the survey asks questions about farmers. I measure on a likert scale from 1
to 7 whether farmers perceived as non-socially responsible to select the non-ecological
gloves and to not donate to the NGO in the study, and the influence on the product
decision of having to decide for others/in a group. I ask farmers whether they think
other participants in the session are more ethical (+1), as ethical (0) or less ethical
(-1) then themselves (other’s ethicality). Finally, the survey includes the GREEN
scale by Haws et al. [41], to predict preference for environmentally friendly products,
reported in Appendix 1.5.3. I calculate a greenness score as the average of the scores
across the 6 questions of the scale.
Farmer’s are on average 44 years old, 32% is female (which, according to the
OECD data, is in line with the average trend in Italy, where the percentage of female
entrepreneurs is quite high), the average “greenness score” is of 6 out of 7 (where the
average score found by Haws et al. [41] on a sample of adult American is around 4).
On average they are willing to give up to e17.3 to donate e5. Farms have on average
3.4 employees, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 40, on average 1.93 people
take decisions with a maximum of 10 people. Their farm has on average been in
business for about 17 years and the farm yearly revenues are usually in the revenue
brackets that goes from 30 to 50,000 e. 36% of them produces an organic product
and more than half of the farmers usually purchase organic products for their farm.
Groups are balanced across the different characteristics, except for the number of
years in business. Controlling for this variable in the regression analysis does not
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modify the results. On average they believe the other farmers in the session to be as
ethical as they are, with small and insignificant difference across treatments.8 The
particular attention of the sample towards social responsibility is important, as it
allows me to study behaviour across treatments of producers who usually consider the
socially-responsible quality of goods. This feature should not affect the comparison
between treatments, but is included as control variable in the analysis that follows.
Table 1.2.3 reports the mean of each survey item for the 4 treatment groups.9
1.3 Hypotheses and Predictions
In the next section, I lay out a simple model based on Bartling et al. [10] to derive
predictions. I then present the hypotheses related to the two dimensions of groups
that could influence the social responsibility of choices: (i) the number of people
responsible for the decision and (ii) the number of people receiving a payoff from the
decision.
Finally, I present the hypotheses for the donation decision.
1.3.1 A simple model - Product Decision
I assume individuals potentially care about their own material payoff, the payoff of
others and the social impact of their product choice. I use a linear utility function
to capture these preferences, of the form
ui = xi + (n− 1) · αi · xj + n · yi/δi + n · y/γi
8Since the survey was administered after the main experiment, the answers about the ethicality
of other subjects in the session and their own social responsibility might be not reliable but a
response to their behaviour in the main experiment. The difference between treatments is though
not significant.
9In ‘C - C’ treatment, 2 subjects did not answer to any of the survey questions and do not
appear in the table
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Table 1.2.3: Summary Satistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
I - I C -I I - C C - C P-value Overall Min Max
Age 48.03 42.10 43.97 45.87 0.78 44.98 22 77
Female 0.27 0.35 0.26 0.35 0.83 0.31 0 1
Years in business 22.11 17.48 12.97 14.30 0.37 16.66 0.5 75
N. of employees 5.17 3.32 2.32 3.00 0.56 3.44 0 40
N. of decision makers 2.02 1.90 1.93 1.90 0.05 1.94 0 10
Yearly revenues 2.37 2.87 2.24 2.34 0.38 2.46 1 7
Locally produced 0.62 0.52 0.77 0.58 0.23 0.62 0 2
Organic product 0.28 0.35 0.37 0.42 0.85 0.36 0 1
Buy organic 0.55 0.48 0.62 0.58 0.79 0.56 0 1
Others’ ethicality 0.04 -0.03 -0.11 0.13 0.36 0.01 -1 1
Greenness score 5.92 6.05 6.06 6.14 0.99 6.04 2.7 7
Observations 30 31 32 31 124
Significant differences in bold, based on a one-way ANOVA on ranks (Kruskal-Wallis) test
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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A monetary gain gives subject i a utility xi, generating a monetary gain for a group-
mate gives utility αi ·xj, where αi is the degree of altruism of the individual. Subjects
with αi = 0 do not care about their group-mate monetary gain, while subjects with
αi > 1 care more about monetary gain when other subjects are involved. n is
the number of subjects in the group receiving the payoff. Producing a negative
externality of purchasign the non-socially responsible product has a cost yi for the
individual, multiplied by the number of subjects in the group receiving the payoff
n.10 δi captures the diffusion of responsibility (and hence of the cost) of producing
the negative externality, which depends on the number of decision makers. If the
decision maker is a single individual δi = 1, if there is more than one decision maker
δi = 1 only if responsibility does not diffuse. γi captures the self-serving altruism
and diffusion of guilt from taking the non-socially responsible action, it depends on
the number of people the subject is taking the decision for. γi = 1 if the subject
decides only for himself or if there is not self-serving altruism.
Table 1.3.1: Utility of the Choices
SR gloves Non SR gloves + Monetary Amount
I - I 0 xi + yi
C - I 0 xi + yi/δi
Group-mate 0 αi · xj + yi/δi
I - C 0 xi + (n− 1) · αi · xj + n · yi/γi
C - C 0 xi + (n− 1) · αi · xj + n · yi/δi + n · yi/γi
Table 1.3.1 summarizes the utilities in different treatments. Deciding for himself
10n is indeed the number of subjects receiving the payoff in the group and hence the number of
non-socially responsible products purchased, when subjects opt for getting the money.
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in ‘I - I’ and ‘C - I’ treatments, a farmer faces a trade off between a utility from the
amount of money xi and the disutility from creating a negative externality yi. In the
‘I - C’ and ‘C - C’ treatments, the decision of gaining the bonus for the group (x euro
for the subject and each one of the group-mates) produces a negative externality yi
for each pair of non-ecological gloves purchased. One pair of gloves is purchased
for each group member, to keep the social externality generated by each subject
constant.
In ‘C - I’ subjects take the product decision also for a group-mate (xi = 0), allowing
me to study altruism and ingroup bias. If farmers have a lower willingness to pay
for the socially responsible quality when deciding for a group-mate (i.e. care more
about ensuring a monetary gain to group members than to themselves) αi > 1,
farmers show ingroup bias. This would influence also the decision in ‘I - C’ and ‘C
- C’ treatments towards a higher focus on monetary gain than in ‘I - I’ and ‘C - I’
respectively. Deciding for the group in these two treatments might also create the
moral wiggle room to behave self-interestedly “in the interest of the group-mates”
(γi 6= 1). If γi > 1, subjects deciding for the payoff of the group have a lower
willingness to pay for“social responsibility” and a focus on monetary gain only when
also their payoff is involved (and not in the decision for the group-mate). Finally,
taking the decision by majority in the ‘C - I’ and ‘C - C’ treatments, the responsibility
of producing the negative externality might diffuse among decision makers (δi 6= 1).
In the next sections, I present the hypothesis related to the two dimensions of groups,
and the three forces that could influence SR in groups.
1.3.2 Social Preferences
A large economic literature has established that people have social preferences and
behave according to moral and social norms [31, 18, 48]. In dictator games, subjects
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usually give away 50% of their budget and evidence of charitable giving is broad [29,
54, 49]. Several models accommodate non-selfish motives for behaviour. Andreoni
[4] builds a model of altruistic behaviour motivated by warm glow giving.11 Fehr
and Schmidt [36] and Bolton and Ockenfels [14] introduce fairness concerns and
the concept of inequity aversion. Rabin [61], Charness and Rabin [21], Falk and
Fischbacher [34] develop models of reciprocity that consider intentions, where people
try to reward kind actions and punish unkind ones.
Socially responsible production can arise because of consumers’ demand for this type
of products and their willingness to pay a price premium. It can also emerge from
a spontaneous internalization of the negative externalities by the firm who, out of
social or environmental concerns, decides to incur the extra cost associated with
socially responsible production. From lab studies on ethical markets we know that
even in monopoly a firm allocates to a passive worker (wage taker) a salary different
from zero, showing ethical concerns.12
The disutility subjects face when creating the negative externality yi can be greater
than 0. It is then predicted that some subjects are willing to give up some payoff to
receive the socially responsible and more expensive goods (table 1.3.1).
Hypotesis 1. If subjects have social preferences, some farmers select the ecological
gloves:
WtpSR > 0
11Warm-glow giving refers to prosocial behaviour causing donors to experience positive feelings,
irrespective of whether their behaviour actually benefits others.
12When in a competitive market consumers start taking SR in production as a decision criterion,
the share of SR products traded rises even more [60].
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1.3.3 First dimension: Collective Decision Making
Diffusion of Responsibility
Many immoral acts require the support of several people, who can share the cost and
the responsibility, making the action bearable. If we expect people to bear a cost
when producing negative externalities, this cost can be shared when the decision is
taken by a group. Diffusion of responsibility and the feeling of not being pivotal is an
important adjuvant for reducing moral behaviour [62], death penalties for example
are often performed by execution teams [8] and the presence of other people inhibits
an individual from intervening in an emergency [52]. Schwartz [63] suggests that
for a moral norm to be activated and applied, a subject must ascribe some personal
responsibility to himself for an action and its consequences. Nyborg et al. [59] develop
a model of ascription of responsibility where people with preferences for a responsible
self image act “green” (socially responsibly) only if they ascribe to themselves the
responsibility on the question at hand.
In group decisions, where majority voting makes it impossible to impute the result
of the choice, subjects make more self-interested decisions [46, 45]. In Dana et al.
[26], when two dictators decide (unanimously) on the amount to transfer to a third
party, the generosity is lower and groups lie more to get a profit gain, if the profits
for group members are aligned [72].
If the disutility subjects face when creating the negative externality yi can be shared
with other decision makers (δi > 1), it is predicted that with collective decision
making by majority subjects ascribe a lower level of responsibility to themselves and
purchase fewer SR products (table 1.3.1). Less ecological gloves are chosen in the ‘C
- I’ treatment than in the ‘I - I’, less ecological gloves are chosen in the ‘C - C’ than
in the ‘I - C’ treatment.
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Hypotesis 2. With diffusion of responsibility, there is a higher focus on monetary
gain when decision making is collective:
WtpSR Collective decision < WtpSR Individual decision
1.3.4 Second dimension: Payoff Commonality
With payoff commonality, there is more defection in prisoner dilemma [22], a lower
cooperation in public good games [44] and more cheating in the die rolling task [39].
This experiment allows me to disentangle two possible forces driving a change in
social responsibility when sharing with others the benefits of behaving non-socially
responsibly.
Ingroup Bias
Many findings show that subjects care about a group’s payoff. The ingroup/outgroup
bias is a well documented and observed phenomenon in the social sciences and is the
tendency to evaluate one’s own group or its members (the ingroup) more favourably
than others and has been discerned in many contexts, such as teacher-student rela-
tions [1]13. Caring for the group can also lead employees to forget about personal
financial gains: if they feel part of the company they will work in the financial inter-
est of the group without the need of strong financial incentives [2, 13, 3]. In Chen
and Li [24], group identity modifies social preferences: subjects are more generous,
more altruistic and less envious towards ingroup members and they maximize the
social welfare more when interacting with ingroup members. Bornstein et al. [15]
find that, in the centipede game, groups show stronger concerns for team payoff
(despite leading them to act closer to the rational solution, exiting earlier from the
game and getting a lower payoff). Being in a group makes you feel responsible for
13For references from psychology and sociology see the survey by Hewstone et al. [43].
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others’ payoff, it seems people value the profit of other group members even more
highly than their own. In Babcock et al. [7], the team compensation system induces
agents to choose the level of effort as if they valued a marginal dollar of compensa-
tion for their team-mate from two-thirds to twice as much as a dollar for themselves.
Conrads et al. [25] show how under team incentives, being responsible of somebody
else’s payoff increases lying, even though the marginal incentive to lie is lower: with
team incentives subjects earn only half of the “profit of their lie”, the other half of
the profit goes to their team-mate.
If subjects are altruistic and show ingroup bias, when deciding (also) for their
group-mates their focus on payoff will be higher than when deciding for themselves.
xi + yi > 0 (which leads to the non socially responsible choice) for a smaller range of
values of x and y than αixj + yi and xi + (n− 1)αixj − nyi. It is predicted subjects
purchase less SR products and care more about the monetary gain when deciding for
another group-mate only, relative to the ‘C - C’.14 It is also predicted that willing-
ness to pay for socially responsible product (WtpSR) is lower in treatments where
payoff is collective and the product is selected for the group. Less ecological gloves
are selected in the ‘I - C’ treatment relative to the ‘I - I’, less ecological gloves in
group-mate and in the ‘C - C’ relative to the ‘C - I’ treatment.
Hypotesis 3. If participants show ingroup bias, αi > 1 and they focus more on
monetary gain when deciding for group-mates and when deciding for their group in
the ‘C - C’ and ‘I - C’ treatments:
WtpSR Collective Payoff < WtpSR Individual Payoff
WtpSR Group-mate Payoff < WtpSR Individual Payoff
14If farmers have a perfect altruism (αi = 1), the decision for himself and for a team-mate in the
‘C - C’ should be the same.
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Moral wiggle room and Self-Serving altruism
It is well known people prefer achieving a socially responsible self image [17, 11, 12].
Research on behavioural ethics shows many unethical acts are committed with people
knowingly manipulating ethical rules in a self-serving fashion (see Shalvi et al. [64] for
a framework centred on the role of self-serving justifications for unethical behaviour).
Many studies show the existence of these self-serving biases [6]. In Gino et al. [39]
subjects cheat more when there is a group profiting from their cheating, but cheating
is even higher if they also can personally benefit from the unethical action. Deciding
not only about own profits but also about profits of other people can create the
moral wiggle room for subjects to act in a non-socially responsible way (focusing
on the monetary gain) with the excuse of being interested in the profits of their
group-mates, without having to feel non-socially responsible [26, 5]. The guilt for
acting non-socially responsibly is hence diffused, with people acting in a non-socially
responsible way without loosing their socially responsible image, exploiting the moral
wiggle room to behave selfishly.
If guilt diffuses for self-serving motives when deciding not only for the self, γi > 1
and the total cost from producing the negative externality reduces when deciding
for a group. Subjects have a higher focus on monetary gains when deciding for not
only themselves but for the group even if αi < 1. Here, subjects care less about
group-mates monetary gain if their gain is not involved, purchasing more socially
responsible expensive products when deciding for others only, but fewer socially
responsible products when their gain is also involved. It is predicted that willingness
to pay for socially responsible product (WtpSR) is high when deciding for a group-
mate (as in ‘I - I’ and ‘C - I’ or higher), but lower when also own payoff is involved.
Hypotesis 4. If participants show self-serving altruism, they focus on monetary gain
under payoff commonality, but not when deciding only for another group-mate:
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WtpSR Collective Payoff < WtpSR Individual Payoff
WtpSR Group-mate Payoff > WtpSR for Individual/Collective Payoff
1.3.5 Donation Decision
Scores on the GREEN scale [41] and the use or production of socially responsible
products in the farm should have a positive correlation with donations (the willing-
ness to pay for the donation), if all measure the social responsibility of the partici-
pant.
Some studies show that people with a higher position at work have lower moral rea-
soning [70, 68, 71], therefore I expect that the higher the number of years in business,
size and earnings of the farm, the lower the social responsibility and the willingness
to donate to charity in the study.
As discussed in section 1.2.2, group decision making and sharing consequences of the
decision might lead to more non-socially responsible behaviour. If continued non-
socially responsible behaviour outside the lab spills over to individual situations, I
expect the number of decision makers and stakeholders of the farm to influence the
individual level of social responsibility in the experiment, observed in the donation
decision.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Non Parametric Results
This section shows the non-parametric estimates comparing the average willingness
to pay for ecological gloves across treatments (figure 1.4.1). Subjects are willing
to pay on average 13.47 efor the the ecological working gloves, which means their
28
willingness to pay for the socially responsible product is positive and behaving non-
SR carries a cost (yi 6= 0). Table 1.4.1 reports the p-values based on a two-sample
Mann-Whitney test, comparing each treatment with ‘I - I’ in column (3), and ‘C -
I’ in column (4).
Wtp for the ecological gloves when deciding by majority in ‘C - I’ treatment, is not
significantly different from ‘I - I’ and group-mate, nor in ‘C - C’ treatment from ‘I
- C’. This shows δi = 1, the cost of taking a non-socially responsible action does
not diffuse in this contest. In ‘C - C’ and ‘I - C’ treatments, where the payoff
and the benefits of the choice are collective, the willingness to pay for the socially
responsible product is significantly lower and the focus is instead on monetary gains.
Either subjects have a particular care over group-mate payoff (αi > 1), or in groups
it is easier to justify you are acting non socially responsibly in the interest of the
group (γ < 1). Deciding for a group-mate does not lead to a different WtpSR than
when deciding for own payoff in the ‘C - I’ treatment. Subjects focus on payoff when
deciding for the group but not when deciding for a group-mate. This shows the lower
social responsibility when deciding for the group in the ‘I - C’ and ‘C - C’ treatments
is not led by altruistic reasons (αi ≤ 1).
The non-parametric analysis shows that subjects have social preferences and taking
non socially responsible actions carries a cost. Deciding in group does not diffuse
responsibility, not modifying the social responsibility of the choice. Deciding for a
group with collective payoff and benefits induces a focus on the monetary gain and
reduces the social responsibility of choices, because it creates the moral wiggle room
for subjects to focus on payoff while feeling socially responsible.
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Table 1.4.1: Willingness to pay for ecological gloves (WtpSR)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Sd p-value vs ( I - I ) p-value vs ( C - I )
I - I 15.867 6.684 0.8336
C - I 14.71 7.542 0.8336
Group-mate 15.548 7.37 0.7885 0.6582
I - C 11.355 8.616 0.0250 0.0426
C - C 9.935 8.981 0.0095 0.0131
Total 13.467 8.148
P-values based on a two-sample Mann-Whitney test.
Figure 1.4.1: Mean willingness to pay for ecological gloves (WtpSR) in each treat-
ment.
Mean of the WtpSR for each group. Valuation measured on a scale from 2 to 20
euro. Error bars reflect +/- 1 standard error of the mean.
I graph the percentage of subjects choosing different switch-points between choos-
ing ecological gloves (SR) and choosing the non-ecological but ‘profitable’ gloves
(non SR). Figure 1.4.2 histograms the Wtp for the ecological gloves of all subjects
30
for each treatment. In ‘I - I, ’‘C - I’ and ‘group-mate’, where benefits of the non
socially responsible choice are not collective, a substantial fraction of subjects refuses
to select and receive the non ecological product for any bonus and none chooses the
non-ecological but ‘profitable’ option in all the 10 decisions. In ‘I - C’ and ‘C -
C’ treatments instead, where payoff is collective, more than 20% of subjects always
prefer the non-socially responsible option, confirming that having other subjects also
benefiting from the non-SR decision modifies social responsibility.
Figure 1.4.2: Willingness to pay for social responsibility by group
Percentage of subjects with different willingness to pay for the ecological gloves by treatment.
Moving to the willingness to donate, the average willingness to donate is not sig-
nificantly different across treatments. Figure 1.4.3 show the distribution of partici-
pants’ willingness to donate. Around 50% of subjects prefer to donate over receiving
any sum of money.
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Figure 1.4.3: Willingness to donate
Percentage of subjects with different willingness to donate.
1.4.2 Regression results
I estimate a Tobit model for the willingness to pay for the socially responsible prod-
uct. I use a Tobit model since the Wtp is censored between 0 and 20 eand several
subjects cluster at the limits. In columns (1) and (2) I analyse the effect of col-
lective decision making and collective payoff on social responsibility, by including a
dummy for each of the two dimensions and their interaction. Here the decision for
the group-mate only is not included. In columns (3) and (4) I analyse the effect of
each treatment on social responsibility, including the decision for only the group-
mate. Column (2) and (4) show the augmented model, which includes controls for
several characteristics of the farm and farmer and a session fixed effect. The Tobit
model echoes the results from the non-parametric analysis. In appendix 1.5.5 I re-
port the OLS analysis. The pattern of significance is the same, but discarding the
censored nature of the data leads to smaller coefficients on the treatments, reducing
the magnitude of the effect of payoff commonality.
Collective decision making by majority does not change the willingness to pay for the
socially responsible product. Collective payoff increases the focus on monetary gains,
in both ‘I - C’ and ‘C - C’ treatments subjects switch to choosing the non-ecological
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but profitable option for a lower monetary bonus. Deciding for a group-mate only
(‘Group-mate’) in the ‘C - I’ treatment does not change significantly the willingness
to pay for the ecological product, confirming the hypothesis of self-serving altruism
when deciding for collective payoff. In treatments with collective payoff subjects
switch to selecting the non-SR good for a bonus 13 elower than when deciding for
themselves (17 euro lower if I control for the farm and farmer’s characteristics and
include session fixed effects). The interaction between collective decision making
and collective payoff does not modify willingness to pay for the socially responsible
product further. The measure of social responsibility I collect in the lab (willingness
to pay for the ecological gloves) is correlated with the willingness to donate and is
externally valid, correlating with the greenness of the farmer and the farm. The
number of employees and decision makers in the farm does not influence the willing-
ness to pay for the socially responsible product instead.
I also analyse the relation between the characteristics collected in the survey
and the individual donation decision with a Tobit model (table 1.5.5). The average
willingness to donate is 17.13 and is influenced by the number of decision makers in
the farm. While having to decide for more subjects (a higher number of employees)
leads to slightly less donations (in line with the result that sharing consequences
of the choice leads to fewer SR choices), a higher number of decision makers in
the farm increases the willingness to donate. As for the other characteristics, older
subjects donate slightly more and farmers with a higher Greenness score or whose
farm produces a socially responsible product donate significantly more.
When eliciting willingness to pay with the help of a price list, there is the pos-
sibility of subjects switching multiple times between the two options. 9% of sub-
jects switches multiple times in the product decision, 1% when deciding about the
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Table 1.4.2: Tobit model of Willingness to pay for the Socially Responsible product
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WtpSR WtpSR WtpSR WtpSR
Two dimensions
Collective Decision -0.911 2.061
(0.877) (0.719)
Collective Payoff -13.62∗∗ -17.70∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.005)
Collective Decision*Payoff -0.809 2.417
(0.919) (0.761)
Treatments (baseline: I - I)




I - C -13.68∗∗ -17.39∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.003)





Willingness to donate 0.664∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Years in business -0.465∗∗∗ -0.485∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.001)
N. of employees -0.374 -0.311
(0.394) (0.428)
N. of decision makers -0.251 -0.432
(0.897) (0.809)
Yearly revenues 2.040 2.102∗
(0.117) (0.070)
Locally produced 0.915 0.534
(0.828) (0.883)
Organic product -5.672 -6.475∗
(0.218) (0.100)
Buy organic 7.114 7.819∗
(0.158) (0.076)






Constant 27.17∗∗∗ -18.49 27.25∗∗∗ -21.38
(0.000) (0.290) (0.000) (0.153)
Observations 123 103 154 131
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.4.3: Tobit regression of the Willingness to Donate
(1) (2)
WtpD WtpD
Dimensions I vary experimentally
N. of decision maker 3.859 9.109∗∗
(0.164) (0.025)

























∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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product for a group-mate and 12% in the donation choice. In order to ensure multi-
switchers do not affect results, I test for robustness using different measures of Wtp
for multi-switchers. All the analysis presented uses the first switch-point, excluding
multi-switchers from the analysis does not significantly affect results (the Tobit mod-
els for the willingness ot pay for the ecological gloves and the willingness to donate
excluding multi-switchers are in Appendix 1.5.6).
1.4.3 Checks
Before the product decision, I ask some control questions on the decision and pay-
ment mechanisms. The decision mechanism in the ‘C - I’ treatment was the hardest
to understand, with around 80% of subjects understanding it (details in Appendix
1.5.4, table 1.5.2).
In the survey I ask farmers about the different influences on the choice between eco-
logical and non-ecological gloves. They report the main influences to be the ecological
quality of the gloves (mean score of 5.28 on a likert scale from 1 = no influence at
all; to 7 = huge influence), followed by the social responsibility of production (score
of 5.05). The actual quality of the gloves influences the decision to a lower extent
(score of 4.40), while farmers report that the possibility of earning a bonus has a
very small influence on their selection (score of 2.87).
I ask farmers about my measures of social responsibility: subjects consider not donat-
ing and choosing the non-ecological gloves plus the monetary bonus as non-socially
responsible (mean score of around 3.5 for both behaviours, on a likert scale from 1 =
not socially responsible; to 7 = very socially responsible). I also calculate the cor-
relation between my measures of socially responsible behaviour, willingness to pay
for the socially responsible product, willingness to donate and the other measures
of ethical behaviour collected in the survey (i.e. the greenness score, beliefs on the
36
social responsibility of non-donating and purchasing non-ecological gloves and the
ethical characteristics of the farm). There is a low correlation between the measures
in general, with the exception of a medium correlation between the two willingness
to pay. The correlation table is in Appendix 1.5.4, table 1.5.3.
1.5 Conclusion
This study with farmers improves the understanding of producers’ socially responsi-
ble choices. First, complementing research on group decision making by separating
the impact of collective decision making and collective payoff on socially responsi-
ble behaviours. In line with the literature, groups show lower social responsibility
[22, 35, 46, 45]. Collective decision making by majority does not affect choices,
showing how diffusion of responsibility does not depend simply on collective decision
making. Being responsible for the payoff of a group of subjects instead increases the
focus on payoff and reduces social responsibility. This study allows us to show that
the motive behind the lower social responsibility is not ingroup bias and altruistic
interest towards the payoff of ingroup members. Instead, deciding for a group cre-
ates the moral wiggle room for subjects to choose the monetary gain while feeling
socially responsible, showing self-serving altruism in line with Babcock and Loewen-
stein [6], Gino et al. [39], Shalvi et al. [64]. Indeed when deciding for another group
member only, subjects do not have a higher focus on payoff and “remain” socially
responsible. Only when their payoff benefits as well from the non socially responsible
choice, in case of payoff commonality, there is a decrease in social responsibility.
Second, this paper improves the understanding in corporate socially responsible
choices by providing evidence on actual producers. Producers social responsibil-
ity has previously been studied in experiments with students, using fictitious goods
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in a laboratory setting. This study instead offers new evidence on the willingness
to pay of farmers, owners of a company, for a socially responsible product for their
company in a “familiar” setting.
More research is needed to study the impact of the two dimensions of collective
decision making and collective payoff on social-responsibility in the lab, including a
between subject comparison of the decision for a group-mate only. Moreover, col-
lective decision making in the experiment happen in condition of full anonimity and
without communication, making it important to study the impact of this dimension
in case of communication between subjects and including reputation concerns. In the
product decision, the relative small price relevance of the gloves on the production
might induce a higher level of social responsibility, though the comparative statics
of the behaviour between treatments remain relevant.
These findings could also provide important insights for the design of organisa-
tions and institutions. When having to take decisions that benefit also their ingroup,
subjects behave in a less socially responsible way by exploiting the moral wiggle room
created by having to care for their ingroup. While caring for the stakeholders is an
important feature, it may also lead to high costs for the society. With the goal of
having corporations internalizing their negative externalities, a first important step
would be to make salient to decision makers how social responsibility is relevant for
the people they decide for. Running surveys among employees to then report their
preference for social responsibility in their corporation to the board of directors is a
first step to take. In organisations that also share payoff and profits, it might then
be necessary to create a stronger code of conduct to limit non socially responsible
behaviours. Several studies have shown that increasing the salience of the ethical
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code and giving the opportunity to achieve a certification decreases the room for




1.5.1 Confederazione Italiana Agricoltori (CIA)
CIA was formed in 1977 and is, together with Confagricultura, one of the main union
of the agricultural sector in Italy, representing 900, 000 farmers. CIA works for the
improvement and enhancement of the primary sector and for the protection of the
conditions of its employees. It provides information on all major policy and legisla-
tive matters that might affect the businesses of its members and offers a wide range
of services. CIA offers legal advice to ensure compliance with all tax provisions,
legal help with complying to all norms to set up an enterprise and advice on the best
business form to adopt. It also provides business and administrative consultancy,
by helping formulating a business plan and a strategy, and accounting consultancy.
CIA head office is in Rome, the union is part of the European agricultural union
(Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations, COPA) and of the World
Farmers’ Organisation (WFO). It is organised locally in regional and provincial as-
sociations with legal autonomy. In Tuscany, where I run the experiment, it has a
total of 18,544 farmers affiliated.
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Table 1.5.1: Affiliates by area and age
Affiliates per Age Group





152 246 468 903 181 1950
Arezzo 195 279 784 1102 159 2519
Grosseto 326 565 1247 1564 511 4213
Livorno 80 145 323 578 62 1188
Pisa 100 129 430 696 87 1442
Pistoia 154 227 452 499 91 1423
Siena 452 478 1120 1708 386 4144
Lucca
Massa Carrara
166 233 478 760 28 1665
Tot.
per age group
1625 2302 5302 7810 1505 18544
1.5.2 Recruitment Material



































‐ Be  useful  to  the  productive  process  of  the  confederation  (for  example  ink  for  the  printers, 
advertisement material)  














































































PhD student Martina Vecchi 











Please give us your email so we can send you a confirmation of the purchase/money distribution: 
 
Email  ___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Informed Consent Form 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet (as specified in 
this document header) for the above study and have had the opportunity to 
consider the information and ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time, without giving any reason. 
3. I agree to take part in the study “Entrepreneurial Choices” 
   
Date ____________________________     Signature ____________________________ 
 
 
Figure 1.5.2: Informed Consent for Producers
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1.5.3 Green scale
In the experiment, I measure the greenness score as the average score of the 6 ques-
tions part of the GREEN score developed by Haws et al. (2014). The questions on
the scale are reported here below.
On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), how much do you
agree with each of the following statements:
1. It is important to me that the products I use do not harm the environment.
2. I consider the potential environmental impact of my actions when making many
of my decisions.
3. My purchase habits are affected by my concern for our environment.
4. I am concerned about wasting the resources of our planet.
5. I would describe myself as environmentally responsible.




Before taking the decision between ecological and non ecological gloves, subjects were
asked some control questions about their understanding of the decision mechanism
(whether their decision was made in a group or individually and whether the decision
had consequences for the group or only the individual) and of the mechanism of
selection (only 1/3 of subject and 1 decision every 10 was implemented). The table
below reports the number of subjects responding correctly to all the control questions
(correct), the number of people responding correctly only to the questions about
the decision mechanism (correct decision mechanism) and the number of people
answering non correctly to both parts (not correct).
Table 1.5.2: Understanding of the decision making mechanism
Treatments
I - I I - C C - I C - C Total
Correct
N. of sbj 25 23 18 27 93
%b 89.29 71.88 62.07 84.38 74.00
Correct
decision mechanism a
N. of sbj 1 6 6 3 16
%b 3.57 18.75 20.69 9.38 14.67
Not Correct
N. of sbj 2 3 5 2 12
%b 7.14 9.38 17.24 6.25 11.33
Total
N. of sbj 28 32 29 32 121
%b 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
a Incorrect answers refer to the drawing mechanism of selection of participants and decision
pair to implement, not to the decision making mechanism (individual or group payoff and
decision).
b Percentage of farmers answering in a correct, partially correct, incorrect way to the control
questions.
Table 1.5.3 reports the correlation betweeen the variables measuring social re-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.5.5 OLS regression models
Table 1.5.4 below reports the OLS models for the effect of collective decision mak-
ing and collective payoff on social responsibility of choices in the decision between
ecological and non ecological gloves. As in the Tobit model presented in the main
text, collective payoff significantly reduces the social responsibility of choices while
collective decision making does not modify social responsibility.
Table 1.5.5 reports the OLS model for the impact of the farm and farmers’ charac-
teristics on the willingness to donate to charity. As in the Tobit model reported in
the main text, the number of people with decisional power in the farm, the greenness
score and whether the farm produces an organic product are positively related to
the willingness to donate.
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Table 1.5.4: OLS regression of Wtp for SR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WtpSR WtpSR WtpSR WtpSR
Dimensions
Collective Decision -1.157 -1.158
(0.527) (0.564)
Collective Payoff -4.512∗∗ -5.642∗∗
(0.024) (0.026)
Collective Decision*Payoff -0.262 0.986
(0.928) (0.763)
Treatments (baseline: I - I)




I - C -4.512∗∗ -5.456∗∗
(0.023) (0.020)





Wtp for donation 0.281∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)
Years in business -0.187∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.001)
N. of employees -0.218 -0.210∗
(0.114) (0.055)
N. of decision makers -0.191 -0.275
(0.751) (0.606)
Yearly revenues 0.458 0.503
(0.349) (0.192)
Locally produced -0.268 -0.646
(0.900) (0.719)
Organic product -1.917 -2.340
(0.313) (0.112)
Buy organic 1.897 1.934
(0.266) (0.161)






Constant 15.87∗∗∗ 2.787 15.87∗∗∗ 2.028
(0.000) (0.692) (0.000) (0.710)
Observations 123 103 154 131
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5.5: OLS regression of WtpD
(1) (2)
WtpD WtpD
Dimensions I vary experimentally
N. of decision maker 1.198∗∗ 2.215∗
(0.013) (0.060)
























p-values in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
p-values below 0.1 in bold.
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1.5.6 Regression analysis excluding multi-switchers
The two tables below report respectively the Tobit model of the impact of collective
decision making and collective payoff on willingness to pay for the socially respon-
sible product (table 1.5.6) and the Tobit model for the impact of farm and farmers’
characteristics on willingness to donate (table 1.5.7) excluding subjects switching
multiple times between behaving socially responsibly and not.
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Table 1.5.6: Tobit model of Wtp for SR gloves excluding multi-switchers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WtpSR WtpSR WtpSR WtpSR
Dimensions
Collective Decision -2.920 -8.100
(0.626) (0.148)
Collective Payoff -10.28∗ -15.81∗∗
(0.097) (0.016)
Collective Decision*Payoff -1.703 5.681
(0.838) (0.476)
Treatments (baseline: I - I)




I - C -10.34∗ -14.64∗∗∗
(0.096) (0.010)





Wtp for donation 0.751∗∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Years in business -0.524∗∗∗ -0.514∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)
N. of employees -0.314 -0.252
(0.384) (0.423)
N. of decision makers 0.449 0.0888
(0.778) 0.950)
Yearly revenues 2.223∗ 2.303∗∗
(0.060) (0.027)
Locally produced -11.58∗∗∗ -9.774∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008)
Organic product -1.534 -1.534 -0.271
(0.659) (0.659) (0.948)
Buy organic 10.92∗∗ 10.63∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.010)






Constant 19.03∗∗∗ 9.895∗∗∗ 19.15∗∗∗ 9.130∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 112 93 142 120
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5.7: Tobit regression of Wtp for donation excluding multiswitchers
(1) (2)
WtpD WtpD
Dimensions I vary experimentally
N. of decision makers 3.738 9.890∗∗
(0.197) (0.027)

























∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Instructions
This section reports the instructions of the experiment translated from Italian. The introduction,
part two and the questionnaire are common to all four treatments and are reported only once in
1.5.7, 1.5.12 and 1.5.13. The overview and first part are reported for each treatment.
1.5.7 Introduction - Common to all Treatments
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR PARTICIPATING IN THE STUDY!
Instructions With your participation, you have the chance of taking a decision about
receiving a product for your farm, making a donation and earning an amount of money.
Your anonymity is ensured: other participants will not know your decisions in this experiment.
At the end of the session, you will receive your money from a researcher who is not present in the
room. Neither the other participants nor the researchers will be able to see how much money you
have earned.
Please note: Throughout the whole session, we ask you to not use your phone or communicate
with each other. Communication between the participants is not allowed.
If you have any questions please raise your hand. Your question will then be answered at your seat.
All statements made in these instructions are true and your decisions will be implemented in the
way we describe below if you are selected.
Overview of the Experiment
1. Part One
You have the chance to take a decision for your farm. You will choose which product to
receive between two alternatives, an ecological one and one without the ecological quality
which allows you to receive also a varying payment. We ask each of you to take several
decisions for different amounts of the payment additional to the non ecological product, but
only one of those decisions will be randomly selected and implemented. In this part only 1
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every 3 of you will be randomly selected to have their choice implemented. All the draws
will be done by one of you at the end of the session by drawing a number from a bag.
2. Part Two
Each of you will take 15 decisions between two alternatives X and Y. We will then draw a
number from 1 to 15 and implement the choice for that decision pair for those of you not
selected in Part One.
3. Questionnaires
We will ask you to answer some questions about your firm and your experience in this study.
1.5.8 ‘I - I’ Treatment - Individual decision and payoff
Beginning of the Study - Part One
You have to decide about receiving a product for your farm.
You have to take 10 decisions. We ask you to decide between the alternatives for each decision pair
by ticking the box close to the preferred alternative.
Each of you will have to take the following decisions about the product and your gain. We will select
at random 1 every 3 of you, his decision will be implemented and will determine his earnings.
Of the 10 decision pairs, only 1 will be implemented according to your decision, if you are
selected.
If you are not selected (2 every 3 of you are not selected), none of your choices will be applied and
you will not gain anything in this first part.
Recap:
1. You take 10 decisions about the product and the payoff.
2. 1 every 3 of you is selected.
3. 1 every 10 decision pairs is drawn.
4. The preferred alternative (A or B) in the decision pair drawn determines the product you
receive and the gains of the selected person.
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You have to decide between receiving two types of working gloves for your farm at different
conditions. You will receive a pairs of the gloves you selected. The two gloves fulfil the same
function and the two types are:
A ”ECOLOGICAL WORKING GLOVES”:
Bamboo working gloves, made of sustainable bamboo.
Bamboo is one of the fastest growing plants in the world.
Bamboo is a natural product that grows without any pesticides or fertilizers.
Bamboo is completely biodegradable, using it in the productive process instead of synthetic
fibers it helps reducing waste.
Produced in sweatfree plants.
Excellent abrasion resistance.
B ”NON ECOLOGICAL WORKING GLOVES”:
Nylon working gloves, made in nylon knit.
Nylon is one of the most used man-made synthetic fiber.
Nylon is made from petrochemicals introduced as an early substitute for silk.
Excellent abrasion resistance.
This is an example of the decisions you will face
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The 10 decision pairs are listed on the next page. The alternative A does not vary while
the gain in alternative B varies for each decision pair.
Please tick the box next to the choice you prefer for each of the 10 decision pairs. In total,
you will have to cross 10 boxes.
If you are selected, your choice for the decision pair drawn will be implemented and will determine
your gains.
If for example decision pair 2 is selected and you marked alternative A, we will buy a pair of
the the ECOLOGICAL GLOVES for your farm and you will receive no payment. If you selected
alternative B, we will buy a pair of the the NON ECOLOGICAL GLOVES and the experimenter
in the next room will put 18 euro in the envelope you will receive when leaving the experiment.
The gloves you choose will be sent to your farm by courier at the address you gave us in the consent.
Comprehension questions
Select the box corresponding to the correct answer. Please raise your hand if you have
any doubt about the correct answer.
How many people will take the decision about the product and your gain with you, if you are
selected, in this first part (you included)?
0 2 6
How many people will share potential payoff with you, in this first part?
0 6 2
How many people will we draw in this first part?
Everybody 1 every 3 of you 2 every 3 of you
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How many decisions do you have to take (total number of boxes that you will have to cross) ?
20 10 1















































1.5.9 ‘I - C’ Treatment - Individual decision and collective
payoff
Beginning of the Study - Part One
You have to decide about receiving a product for your farm and the farm of 2 other farmers
(another 1 if we do not have enough participants).
You have to take 10 decisions for yourself and 2 other farmers. We ask you to decide between
the alternatives for each decision pair by ticking the box close to the preferred alternative. Your
decision, if you are selected, will determine the product and the potential payoff re-
ceived by the 3 group members (you included). The 2 other people will not take part in the
decision but just share potential payoff and receive the product. You will not know the identity of
your group members and vice versa.
You will have to take the following decisions regarding the budget of the group. We will then
select at random 1 every 3 of you, if you are selected your choice will be implemented determining
the payoff and the product received by the 3 members of the group. Of the 10 decision pairs,
only 1 will be implemented according to your decision.
If you are not selected (2 every 3 of you are not selected), none of your choices will be applied and
your gain in this first part will depend on the decision of the selected member of your group.
Recap:
1. You take 10 decisions about the product and the payoff, for you and other 2
people. Those 2 individuals do not take the decision with you but share with you
any payoff.
2. 1 every 3 of you is selected.
3. 1 every 10 decision pairs is drawn.
4. The preferred alternative of the person selected in the decision pair drawn determines the
product and gains the 3 group members receive.
62
You have to decide between receiving two types of working gloves for your farms at different
conditions. The two gloves fulfil the same function and the two types are:
A ”ECOLOGICAL WORKING GLOVES”:
Bamboo working gloves, made of sustainable bamboo.
Bamboo is one of the fastest growing plants in the world.
Bamboo is a natural product that grows without any pesticides or fertilizers.
Bamboo is completely biodegradable, using it in the productive process instead of synthetic
fibers it helps reducing waste.
Produced in sweatfree plants.
Excellent abrasion resistance.
B ”NON ECOLOGICAL WORKING GLOVES”:
Nylon working gloves, made in nylon knit.
Nylon is one of the most used man-made synthetic fiber.
Nylon is made from petrochemicals introduced as an early substitute for silk.
Excellent abrasion resistance.
This is an example of the decisions you will face
The 10 decision pairs are listed on the next page. The alternative A does not vary while the
gain in alternative B varies for each decision pair.
63
Please tick the box next to the choice you prefer for each of the 10 decision pairs. In total,
you will have to cross 10 boxes.
If you are selected, your choice for the decision pair drawn will be implemented and will determine
the gains of your group.
If for example decision pair 2 is selected and you marked alternative A, we will buy the ECO-
LOGICAL GLOVES for you 3 and you 3 will receive no payment. If you selected alternative B, we
will buy the NON ECOLOGICAL GLOVES for you 3 and the experimenter in the next room will
put 18 euro in the envelope each of you 3 will receive when leaving the experiment. The gloves you
choose will be sent to you and your group mates by courier at the address you gave us in the consent.
Comprehension questions
Select the box corresponding to the correct answer. Please raise your hand if you have
any doubt about the correct answer.
How many people will take the decision about the product and your gain with you, if you are
selected, in this first part (you included)?
0 2 6
How many people will share potential payoff with you, in this first part?
0 6 2
How many people will we draw in this first part?
Everybody 1 every 3 of you 2 every 3 of you
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How many decisions do you have to take (total number of boxes that you will have to cross) ?
20 10 1















































1.5.10 ‘C - I’ Treatment - Collective decision, individual pay-
off
Beginning of the Study - Part One
With 2 other participants in this room (another 1 if we do not have enough participants), you have
to decide about receiving a product for your farm.
You will decide in a group with 2 other producers participating to the study. Each of you will decide
individually, the final decision will then be the one preferred by the majority and will only
affect the product you receive and your payment, not theirs. The groups are randomly
formed and the identity of the other 2 participants will never be revealed to you (and vice versa).
Your group has 10 decisions to take. We ask you to decide between the alternatives for each
decision pair by ticking the box close to the preferred alternative. You do not decide alone: the
final decision about your personal payoff and product will be the one preferred by the majority (2
out of 3 group members).
You will have to take the choices that follow about your payment and the product to receive.
We will then select at random 1 in 3 people, if you are selected the result of the majority
voting will determine your payment and product. Of the 10 decision pairs, only 1 will
be implemented according to the decision of the majority. If you are not selected (2 in 3 people
are not selected), none of your choices will be implemented and you will receive no payment in this
first part. Later in the study we will ask you to take the same decisions with respect to the product
and the payment of another member of your group, in case you are not the one selected. Only the
payoff of the group member selected will be determined by the majority.
Recap:
1. You take 10 decisions about your personal payoff and product.
2. 1 every 3 of you is selected.
3. 1 every 10 decision pairs is drawn.
4. The preferred alternative in the decision pair drawn determines the product and the gains
the selected person receives.
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Your group has to decide between receiving two types of working gloves for your farm at
different conditions. You will receive a pair of the gloves your group selected. The two gloves fulfil
the same function and the two types are:
A ”ECOLOGICAL WORKING GLOVES”:
Bamboo working gloves, made of sustainable bamboo.
Bamboo is one of the fastest growing plants in the world.
Bamboo is a natural product that grows without any pesticides or fertilizers.
Bamboo is completely biodegradable, using it in the productive process instead of synthetic
fibers it helps reducing waste.
Produced in sweatfree plants.
Excellent abrasion resistance.
B ”NON ECOLOGICAL WORKING GLOVES”:
Nylon working gloves, made in nylon knit.
Nylon is one of the most used man-made synthetic fiber.
Nylon is made from petrochemicals introduced as an early substitute for silk.
Excellent abrasion resistance.
This is an example of the decisions you will face
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The 10 decision pairs are listed on the next page. The alternative A does not vary while the
gain in alternative B varies for each decision pair.
Please tick the box next to your preferred alternative for each of the 10 decision pairs. In
total, you will have to cross 10 boxes.
If you are selected, the alternative preferred by the majority for the decision pair drawn will be
implemented and will determine your gains.
If for example decision pair 2 is selected and at least 2 out of 3 of you marked alternative A, we
will buy a pair of ECOLOGICAL GLOVES for your farm and you will receive no payment. If the
majority selected alternative B, we will buy a pair of the NON ECOLOGICAL GLOVES and the
experimenter in the next room will put 18 euro in the envelope you will receive when leaving the
experiment.
The gloves your group choose will be sent to your farm by courier at the address you gave us in
the consent.
Comprehension questions
Select the box corresponding to the correct answer. Please raise your hand if you have
any doubt about the correct answer.
How many people decide about the product and your gain, if you are selected, in this first part
(you included)?
1 3 6
How many people will we draw in this first part?
Everybody 1 every 3 of you 2 every 3 of you
How many people will you share potential payoff with?
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1 6 3
How many decisions do you have to take (total number of boxes that you will have to cross)
?
20 10 1















































If you are not selected, your previous decisions to allocate your budget will not be executed
and your payment in this first part is zero.
We now ask each of you to take a similar decision another one of your group members. The
following choices will affect the member of the group drawn (if you are not drawn). Also these
choices will be taken by majority, by you and the other 2 group members.
We remind you that the following decisions are about the budget of the other 2 group members














































1.5.11 ‘C - C’ Treatment - Collective payoff and decision
Beginning of the Study - Part One
With 2 other participants in this room (1 if we do not have enough participants) you have to decide
about receiving a product for your farms. Each of you will decide individually, the final decision
will then be the one preferred by the majority (2 out of 3 group members) and will determine
your payment and the product you will receive. The groups are randomly formed and the
identity of the other 2 participants will never be revealed to you (and vice versa).
Your group has to take 10 decisions. We ask each of you to decide between the alternatives for
each decision pair by ticking the box close to the preferred alternative. The final decision will be
the one preferred by the majority (2 out of 3 group members).
We will then select with a draw 1 every 3 groups, the product and the payment of the 3 group
members selected will depend on the choice of the majority. Of the 10 decision pairs, only
1 will be implemented according to the decision of the majority. The outcome preferred by
the majority (alternative preferred by at least 2 out of 3 of you) for this selected decision will be
implemented determining the payoff and the product received by the group.
If your group is not selected (2 every 3 groups are not selected), none of your choices will be applied
and you will not gain anything in this first part.
Recap:
1. In a group with 2 other participants, you take 10 decisions about the product
and the payoff by majority voting.
2. Each group has 1/3 chance to be selected.
3. 1 every 10 decision pairs is drawn.
4. The alternative preferred by the majority in the decision pair drawn determines the products
and the gains of the 3 group members.
Your group has to decide between receiving two types of working gloves for your farms at
different conditions. The two gloves fulfil the same function and the two types are:
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A ”ECOLOGICAL WORKING GLOVES”:
Bamboo working gloves, made of sustainable bamboo.
Bamboo is one of the fastest growing plants in the world.
Bamboo is a natural product that grows without any pesticides or fertilizers.
Bamboo is completely biodegradable, using it in the productive process instead of synthetic
fibers it helps reducing waste.
Produced in sweatfree plants.
Excellent abrasion resistance.
B ”NON ECOLOGICAL WORKING GLOVES”:
Nylon working gloves, made in nylon knit.
Nylon is one of the most used man-made synthetic fiber.
Nylon is made from petrochemicals introduced as an early substitute for silk.
Excellent abrasion resistance.
This is an example of the decisions you will face
The 10 decision pairs are listed on the next page. The alternative A does not vary while the
gain in alternative B varies for each decision pair.
Please tick the box next to the choice you prefer for each of the 10 decision pairs. In total,
you will have to cross 10 boxes.
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If your group is selected, your choice for the decision pair drawn will be implemented and will
determine the gains of your group.
If for example decision pair 2 is selected and and at least 2 out of 3 of you marked alternative
A, we will buy the ECOLOGICAL GLOVES for you 3 and you 3 will receive no payment. If the
majority selected alternative B, we will buy the NON ECOLOGICAL GLOVES and the experi-
menter in the next room will put 18 euro in the envelope each of you 3 will receive when leaving the
experiment.
The gloves your group chose will be sent to your farm and to your group mates by courier at the
address you gave us in the consent.
Comprehension questions
Select the box corresponding to the correct answer. Please raise your hand if you have
any doubt about the correct answer.
How many people will take the decision about the product and your gain with you, if you are
selected, in this first part (you included)?
0 2 6
How many people will share potential payoff with you, in this first part?
0 6 2
How many people will we draw in this first part?
Everybody 1 every 3 of you 2 every 3 of you
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How many decisions do you have to take (total number of boxes that you will have to cross) ?
20 10 1















































1.5.12 Part Two - Common to all Treatments
In this part, we ask you to decide in a choice list setting between two different allocations X and Y.
On the following page, you will see 15 decision pairs like the one below. Each decision pair consists
of the following two alternatives:
• Alternative X consists of an amount of money that varies and that will be paid to you.
• Alternative Y is a money donation of 5 Euro to ASeS.
ASeS (Agricoltori Solidarietà e Sviluppo, farmers solidarity and development) is a
non-governmental organization (NGO) whose mission is to support rural communities in developing
countries. Its projects aim at developing the agricultural capacities of those communities, at making
the benefits of new technologies available and at improving the socio-sanitary aspects of the villages.
Among the recent projects are the renovation of the water and sanitary system after severe droughts
in several districts of Africa, the fight against drug addiction and abuse in Lebanon and the creation
of a fair-trade laboratory for chocolate production.
An example of the decisions you will face:
For each decision pair you will have to decide on your preferred allocation. We will then select
at random 1 in 15 decision pairs. This pair is then relevant for payment, for those of you not se-
lected in the product decision. If you chose alternative X, you will receive the respective amount of
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money. The experimenter in the next room will add the amount in the folder you will receive when
leaving the experiment. If you chose alternative Y, we will send a 5 euro donation to ASeS. The
confirmation of the total amount donated to the two charieties during this session will be sent by
email to the address you gave us in the consent form. This is to allow you to verify the correctness






      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 2 :  X)  2 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 3 :  X)  4 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 4 :  X)  6 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 5 :  X)  8 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 6 :  X)  10 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 7 :  X)  12 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 





      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
 
DECISION PAIR 9 :  X)  16 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
  
DECISION PAIR 10 :  X)  18 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
  
DECISION PAIR 11 :  X)  20 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
  
DECISION PAIR 12 :  X)  22 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
  
DECISION PAIR 13 :  X)  24 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
  
DECISION PAIR 14:  X)  26 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
  
DECISION PAIR 15 :  X)  28 euro payoff to you, no donation  ☐ 
      Y)  5 euro donation            ☐ 
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1.5.13 Questionnaire - Common to all Treatments
What is your gender?
M F
What is your age
How many years have you been in business for?
How many employees do you have on average in your farm (people you pay wage to)?
How many people make decisions in your farm with you?
Which profit bracket does your farm belongs to?
¡30.000 30-50.000 50-70.000 70-100.000 100-250.000 250-400.000 ¿400.000
Is your product ecological-bio-0 km (please specify)?
Do you usually buy cal goods at your farm (please specify)?
Do you think other farmers value the ecological quality of the product (cross the alternative you
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consider correct):
More than you Like you Less than you
On a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) how much did each of these reason
influence your decision about the gloves:
1. The chance of receiving a payment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. The ecological quality of the product
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. The SR quality of the product (sweatfree production)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. The actual quality of the product
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
On a scale from 1 (not socially responsible) to 7 (very socially responsible)
1. How socially responsible do you see people who have bought the NON ECOLOGICAL GLOVES
in this experiment?
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. How socially responsible do you see people who have NOT donated in this experiment?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
On a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), how much do you agree
with each of the following statements:
1. It is important to me that the products I use do not harm the environment.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. I consider the potential environmental impact of my actions when making many of my decisions.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3. My purchase habits are affected by my concern for our environment.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. I am concerned about wasting the resources of our planet.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. I would describe myself as environmentally responsible.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6. I am willing to be inconvenienced in order to take actions that are more environmentally friendly.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
On a scale from 1 (no influence) to 7 (big influence)
1. How much would your decision be influenced by having to make a decision with a budget allo-
cated to yourself only or a budget allocated to a group of people?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. How much would your decision be influenced by having to decide on your own or in a group by
majority?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Chapter 2. Rewarding children
with a food increases its liking
Parents often use sweet and calorie dense foods to reward their children. We hypothe-
size that such practices may contribute to the formation of unhealthy food preferences.
To test this hypothesis, we conducted a randomized field experiment with 214 children
in 3 schools in Germany. In the treatment classes, children were asked to complete
a cognitive task in 6 visits over 3 weeks, and received dried apples as a reward. In
the control group classes, children received the dried apple unconditionally. Receiving
the food for solving the tasks might induce a positive association of the food with the
positive feeling of being rewarded. It could also be that having to provide effort to
obtain a food enhances the value of that food. We split the treatment groups into two,
varying the length of the effort task between the two treatment groups. This allows
us to identify whether the change in liking of the food reward is driven by the effort
required. Our results show that rewarding children with food does increase their liking
for the food reward. Also, increasing the effort required to obtain the reward does not
impact the liking. These findings suggest that parents and carers should avoid using
unhealthy food as rewards and may even use this mechanism to increase the liking of
healthy food by using such foods as rewards.
Jan Michael Bauer, Michèle Belot, Marina Schröder and Martina Vecchi
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2.1 Introduction
Adverse health outcomes due to poor nutrition are a major concern [49]. In 2010 in
EU, the prevalence of overweight and obesity in children aged 6 to 9 years ranged
from 18% to 57% amongst boys and from 18% to 50% amongst girls [50].These early
signs of obesity are especially worrying, as overweight in early life often persists
into adulthood [36, 15, 39]. Children’s food choices are mainly determined by their
preferences [20], for example the liking for vegetables appears the most significant
predictor of their intake [12]. This makes it essential to understand how preferences
are formed. Also, preferences were found to be malleable among young children be-
fore becoming more rigid with age [19] and a few recent studies provide encouraging
evidence that early interventions may be promising to alter the formation of dietary
habits and reduce obesity [37].
With a field experiment in three primary schools in Cologne, Germany, we pro-
vide novel casual evidence that rewarding the completion of a cognitive task with a
food for a repeated number of times enhances the liking for that food. Following the
social science literature, the practice of using food as a reward may reinforce its liking
for two possible reasons. First, the psychological theory of evaluative conditioning
proposes the positive association of the food with the positive feeling of achievement
might increase its liking [17]. Alternatively, the liking and valuation of an object
can increase with the effort required to obtain this object [34]. To shed more light
on the role of effort, we introduce two treatments: one where the task requires little
effort and one where it requires a lot more effort. Children in the control group, were
simply offered food to control for the exposure effect.1
1According to the exposure effect, repeated tasting of a particular flavour increase its liking and
acceptance consumption [9, 10].
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To detect a change in liking for the food reward, we elicit it before, after the study
and in a 4 weeks follow-up. We elicit 3 different measures of liking for 4 food items
tasted during the session (including the food reward): an incentivised choice of a
food to receive as a snack; the self-reported valuation of the foods on a 4-point
scale ranging from 1 a very sad to 4 a very happy face, measured with smileys; and
count of favourable direct comparisons between the food reward and three alterna-
tive snacks. We find evidence that using food as a reward increases the liking of
this foods. The observed treatment effect seems most in line with positive associ-
ation and evaluative conditioning, where individuals attach an increased value to a
food that they previously received in the positive context of being rewarded. Effort
seems to not play a role in mediating the liking in this context, as additional effort to
receive the food reward does not induce a higher nor a lower liking of the food reward.
In our culture sweets are frequently presented in a positive social-affective con-
text: they are present at parties, at holiday celebrations such as Christmas and
Easter, they are used as reward and reinforcer of good behaviours. About forty
percent of the respondents to a survey among European parents state that they use
food as a reward for their children [31]. A link between the use of food rewarding
practices by parents and higher consumption of sweets by their children has already
been shown by a correlational study[44]. Even though another recent study did not
find a direct effect of food reward use on snack food consumption in the absence of
hunger [18]. Children from households with a high use of food reward or food re-
striction practices ate significantly more snacks after experiments induced negative
mood, compared to a neutral condition[18].
We study the role of using food as a reward for desirable behaviour in enhanching
the liking of that food. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, these results extend
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the existing literature by providing the first causal estimates based on experiential
data gathered in a real-life setting.
We hypothesize that rewarding a desired behaviour with a specific food enhances
liking for that food for two possible reasons. Firstly, previous research suggests that
individual preference and liking can be altered by pairing a conditional stimulus with
other positive or negative (unconditional) stimuli [41]. Associating an item with a
positive experience, even without cognitive awareness, can increase individuals’ pref-
erence for it [17, 23]. Some sparse evidence suggests that conditioning can alter food
preferences among children. For instance, forcing children to eat foods against their
will pairs the food item with negative affect and increases long-term rejection [4].
Positive conditioning with other palatable foods, high caloric content and positive
social context can also influence preference [3, 24, 25]. Associating a food with the
positive feeling of accomplishment could hence enhance its liking.
Secondly, there is substantial evidence from studies in behavioural economics for an
“endowment effect”, where one’s liking of an object is higher if one had to work
harder to obtain it[34]. In psychology, this has been referred to as “effort justifi-
cation”. According to this phenomenon, people who have exerted some effort in
obtaining an object try to reduce the cognitive dissonance between the effort exerted
and the perceived value of the object by increasing their liking of it.2 This effect has
been documented already in children as young as 6 years old [7], however outside
the food domain. Hence, receiving a food as a reward to one’s performance should
2Akerlof and Dickens [1] translate the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance into an eco-
nomic model. In their model people not only have preferences over different states of the world,
but also over their beliefs about those states. As supported by many psychological experiments
[11, 29], crucially people can manipulate their beliefs. According to their model, if the psycholog-
ical benefit of changing the evaluation of the object-reward exceeds the cost due to discomfort of
having invested effort to obtain a non valuable-enough reward, the subject will believe the object
was worth the effort.
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therefore increase its liking. The higher the effort required to obtain the reward, the
higher the increase in liking.
Our paper relates to several policy interventions to improve eating habits inspired
by insights from behavioural economics, in particular a series of interventions tar-
geted at children and schools (see for example Just and Price [27], Team [42] and
Thaler and Sunstein [43]). Interventions at kindergartens and elementary schools
have explored the effect of short messages prompting for fruit and vegetables selec-
tion, giving original names to healthy foods, modifying food presentation and default
options have proven to be successful in improving the selection of healthy items (see
among others Hanks et al. [21], Wansink et al. [46, 45], Smith et al. [40], Just and
Price [26], respectively).3 Another widely explored tool is the use of rewards as stick-
ers or toys, to encourage choice and consumption of fruit and vegetables in schools at
lunch. A series of studies has found positive effects on the short term consumption
and mixed results on long lasting effects of incentivising healthier eating [6, 33, 35].
This use of this tool is though debatable, because of the possibility of crowding out
the intrinsic motivation in eating those foods [8, 32].
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the ex-
perimental environment. We present (1) the recruitment procedure, (2) the outcome
variables, (3) the treatments, (4) the descriptive statistics of the sample, (5) the
analysis of the correation amongst different outcome variables and the transitivity
of preference and (6) finally the hypotheses. Section 2.3 discusses the results, pre-
senting the non parametric analysis first and then the regression analysis. Section
2.4 concludes.





To examine the effect of the use of food as a reward we conducted a clustered ran-
domized field experiment with 214 school children aged 6 to 8 conducted in Cologne,
Germany.4
We contacted all the schools in Cologne with at least three first graders classes,
inviting them to participate to the experiment. We explained the study aimed at
understanding the drivers of dietary choices to design tools to encourage health-
ier eating habits, without giving any specific information. Neither the head of the
schools nor the teachers were informed about the research question until the end of
the experiment. An English version of the letter for the schools is in Appendix 2.4.1,
figure 2.4.1. Three schools responded positively to our interest and were included in
the study. Two of the schools had 3 first grade classes and the third one had 5 classes
participating to the study. The interactions between classes in the same school was
limited during the time of the experiment, hence we do not expect a strong spillover
effect between treatments. 11 classes took part in total. In 3 schools we randomly
assigned classes to 3 treatment groups, including one control, within each school.
Parents were informed about the study prior its beginning with a letter (see Ap-
pendix 2.4.1, figure 2.4.2), they were asked about children’s dietary restrictions and
they could opt out their child at any point in time. Children were also informed that
participation was voluntary and that they could drop out the study at any time. On
the first day of the study, we also distributed a survey to children to take home for
the parents (see Appendix 2.4.1, figure 2.4.3).
4Ethical approval to conduct the study was obtained from the Ethics Sub-Committee of the
School of Economics of The University of Edinburgh.
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2.2.2 Outcome Variables
The study took place in Cologne in the period between April and July 2016 and
consisted in 9 visits per class. During the first 4 weeks, we visited the school twice
per week, with a follow-up visit after one month. The study protocol included 3













Week 8 3rd Assessment session
assessment sessions, we measured children’s liking for a piece of dried apple, the food
reward, with three alternative measures described here below: valuation, comparison
and choice. First, children sampled the dried apple and 3 other snacks (a dried
apricot, a cracker and a natural yogurt). Then ranked their valuation on a 4-point
scale ranging from a sad to a happy smiley (valuation). Second, children were asked
to conduct 5 comparisons of preference between two of the snacks, including two
additional hypothetical comparisons to French fries and gummy bears (comparison).
Third, children were asked to choose their overall preferred snack. This choice was
incentivised as children received their chosen snack at the end of the assessment
session (choice). We additionally ask children to indicate their preference between
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dried apples and 2 food items that are typically popular among children but are
calorie dense (gummy bears and French fries), to test whether using food as a reward
can divert this hypothetical choice from a more palatable-calorie dense item to a
different one. The questionnaires used to determine the self-reported valuation, the
incentivised choice and the hypothetical choices between pairs of food items are in
Appendix 2.4.2, figure 2.4.6, 2.4.7, 2.4.8 and 2.4.9. We chose the 4 snacks based on
pilot sessions in 2 classes (not involved in the experiment), among 10 snacks. Details
are in Appendix 2.4.3.
2.2.3 Treatments
The classes in the control group (CO) and treatment groups were visited at the same
frequency. In the treatment groups, we ensured a balanced exposure to the reward
item by providing assistance to children who had difficulties with the effort task. As
a consequence, all children received a reward from the experimenter, saying: “Well
done, here is your reward!”. In the control group classes, children received an uncon-
ditional offering of the food reward (“Here, have a piece of apple”). All children in
this group eat the food the same number of times to control for the exposure effect,
where repeated tasting of a particular flavour increase its liking and acceptance con-
sumption [9, 47, 10]. Each control session lasted around 5 minutes. In the treatment
classes, children were asked at each visit to complete a cognitive task, and received
the dried apple as a reward for completing the task. The task consisted of counting
a number of random dots in several different pictures. The number of pictures varied
between the two treatment groups: in the effortless group (EL) children had to count
dots in 2 pictures, while in the effortful group (EF) they were required to count dots
in 10 pictures. Varying the number of pictures allows to identify the role of effort in
driving a change in liking of the dried apple. In the effortless group the time needed
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to solve the 2 mandatory puzzles was 2 to 6 minutes, while in the effortful group was
between 4 and 10 minutes.
The positive association of the food with the feeling of achievement is expected to
be similar between the groups, leading to a higher liking of the food reward in both
treatment groups. Since children in the effortful group had to exert more effort by
solving more tasks compared to those in the effortless group, such higher effort could
further enhance the liking of the food reward through the endowment effect. It is
also possible that the higher effort decreases the liking, through the negative costly
experience of providing effort.
In Appendix 2.4.2, figure 2.4.4 is an example of the task. The number of dots in each
picture is chosen randomly in a range 6-18. In both effort conditions children are
instructed about the possibility of solving more than the mandatory puzzles (2 and
10 respectively) although the awarding of the prize depends solely on their correct
completion of the mandatory ones. The number of puzzles solved among the optional
ones could serve as a proxy for the level of intrinsic motivation in the task and to
study whether it changes with repetitions. We also ask children how much did they
like the task (Appendix 2.4.2 figure 2.4.5). The number of puzzles tried among the
optional ones and the self-reported valuation for the task is very similar across the
two effort groups and the 6 sessions. We consider the session ended when all the
children finish counting the dots in the required pictures. Since we offered help to
children in order for all of them to receive the reward, we registered the amount of
help required by children. Help in the effortful group is significantly higher than in
the effortless, controlling for help does not modify the results of the analysis.
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2.2.4 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics in Table 2.2.1 show no differences between the groups in
terms of child characteristics (age and sex) or liking of the food reward in all 3
measures at baseline, suggesting that despite an admittedly small number of classes
the randomization resulted in balanced groups. Results from Table 2.2.1 also show
that refusal of trying the reward and attendance do not vary between treatments and
is unlikely confound our results. Neither exposure nor participation in the treatment
groups differs from the control. To keep the sample consistent between all analytical
steps, we only study children present during all 3 assessments. Such a complete case
analysis yields unbiased estimates as long as observations are missing at random
[5]. In support of this assumption, we fail to predict missing values based on group
assignment or liking at baseline (see Appendix 2.4.5, Table 2.4.4). Also, an analysis
of the full sample is available in the supplemental material (2.4.6, Table 2.4.5).
2.2.5 Correlation and Transitivity
We collect 3 different measures of children’s food liking.
1. Choice: the incentivised choice of a snack among the 4 snack tasted in the
assessment session.
2. Valuation: the self-reported valuation of the food from 1 to 4, with the selection
of a smiley.
3. Comparison: the number of times the food reward is preferred in the pairwise
comparison between two foods.
We report the correlation between these measures in Appendix 2.4.4. The estimates
of the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the different outcome measures for
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Table 2.2.1: Summary Statistics and Initial Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Control Effortless Effortful Total Min Max (1)vs.(2)e (1)vs.(3)e
Number of children:
total 59 79 76 214
allergic to apples 1 0 1 2
incomplete data 10 11 14 35
analyzed 48 68 61 177
Number of classes 3 4 4 11
Age (years)a 6.59 6.59 6.68 6.62 6 8 0.82 0.52
Female (%)a 46 41 48 44 0 1 0.66 0.84
Attendanceb 5.79 5.62 5.57 5.65 0 6 0.10 0.22
Tried rewardc 4.13 4.16 3.98 4.09 0 6 0.92 0.80
Choicesd 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.06 0 1 0.61 0.25
Valuationd 2.31 2.57 2.26 2.40 1 4 0.31 0.96
Comparison d 0.93 0.79 0.90 0.87 0 5 0.54 0.77
a Values based on a parental survey response with varying sample size (N): Control(35);
Effortless (48); Effortful(47).
b Average frequency of attendance to the 6 treatment sessions.
c Average frequency of trying the food reward to the 6 treatment sessions.
d Average value at baseline
e P-values based on a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for ordinal variables.
A two-sample proportions test is used for binary variables.
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each food show a positive correlation in all the assessments (the coefficients in the
bordered boxes). The majority of coefficients identify a moderate or strong cor-
relation, especially between the self-reported valuation and the preferences. The
correlation between liking of different foods is generally negative.
In the pairwise comparison between two foods, there is the possibility that children
show non-transitive preferences (where food A is preferred to food B, food B is pre-
ferred to food C but food C is preferred to food A). Harbaugh et al. [22] studies
whether children’s behaviour is rational and whether it is reasonable to draw in-
ferences about their preferences from their choices. In an experiment 7, 11 and 21
years old subjects are asked to choose their favourite bundle of goods from a list of a
few alternative possibilities. At age 7, children’s choices about consumption already
respect transitivity and show rationality, though some revealed preference violations
are present at all ages. 26% of the participants makes choices that are consistent
with utility maximization at 7, with the percentage raising to 60 for 11-year-old
participants, similarly to 21-year-old participants.
In Appendix 2.4.4, we study the transitivity of preferences in the hypothetical choice
between two of the snacks. In each assessment session each child can violate transi-
tivity 24 times, but the maximum amount of intransitive choices per assessment is
7. 50% of children have transitive preferences (0 violations).
2.2.6 Hypotheses
A. We expect the liking for the food-reward to strengthen in all groups, due to
the exposure effect.
B. If rewarding with a food generates a positive association with the feeling of
accomplishment, children in the two effort treatments have a stronger improve-
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ment in liking for the food-reward than the control group.
This implies children in the two treatment groups will choose dried apple more
often as a snack, give dried apple a better liking and prefer them more often
in the comparisons with other foods.
C. If the amount of effort exert to receive the reward increases its value (i.e.
effort justification effect), children in the effortful treatment have a stronger
improvement in liking for the food-reward than the effortless treatment.
Alternatively, the literature in economics assumes a cost of effort, with effort entering
the utility function with a negative sign [30, 2].
C.a If effort is costly, in the effortful group the higher disutility from effort reduces
the positive association of the food-reward with the feeling of achievement.
Children in the effortful treatment have a decrease in liking for the food-reward
than the effortless treatment.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Non Parametric Analysis
First, we show and compare the distributions of all 3 outcome measures (see Fig-
ure 2.3.1). In the control group we find a higher liking of the food reward in later
assessments, confirming the positive impact on liking of exposure. In our experi-
mental set-up, we keep exposure to the dried apples constant for all groups and can
therefore cleanly distinguish between exposure and treatment effects. Comparing
children who received the dried apple unconditionally to those who received it as a
reward, we observe significant treatment effects in all three measures of liking. In-
deed, compared to the control group, children in the treatment groups have a higher
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liking for the food-reward in all 3 measures during the second assessment. Panel (a)
in Figure 2.3.1 presents the incentivised measure (percentage of children choosing
the dried apple as a snack, among the 4 snacks tasted in the assessment), panel
(b) presents the mean valuation of the dried apple measured with the selection of a
smiley and panel (c) presents the mean number of times the apple was preferred to
an alternative food in the pairwise comparison. For the effortless group, we observe
an increased liking of the dried apple measured with all the 3 outcome measured.
These differences are statistically significant for valuation [Mann-Whitney test (M-
WT): z=2.39, P=0.02] and comparison [M-WT: z=1.93, P=0.05], but not for choice
[Two-sample proportions test (TPT): z=1.24, P=0.22]. No significant difference
can be observed between children in the control and effortful group [M-WT: valua-
tion, z=1.15, P=0.28; TPT: choice, z=0.54, P=0.59; M-WT: comparison, z=1.19,
P=0.24]. The respective effects sizes can be considered small to medium, with higher
values for the effortless [valuation, d=0.36; choice, d=0.42; comparison, d=0.44] than
the effortful group [valuation, d=0.20; choice, d=0.20; comparison, d=0.29].
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Figure 2.3.1: Mean results
Panels a-c show the means of the 3 outcome variables for dried apple at all 3 as-
sessments for each group. Incentivised choice measured as percentage of children
picking apples as their preferred snack. Valuation measured on 4-point ordinal scale
from 1 (I hate the food) to 4 (I love the food). Comparison measured as number
of times apples are preferred in direct comparison to the 3 other foods and 2 hypo-
thetical snacks. Error bars reflect +/- 1SEM. Between group differences from the
non-parametric significance tests indicated by * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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We then analyse the effect of our intervention as the average difference in lik-
ing between assessments. Table 2.3.1 reports the average differences in liking across
treatments. Figure 2.3.2 displays the short-term effect as the average difference in
liking between the first and the second assessment for the control group and the
treatment groups. We confirm a general increase in the liking which also effects the
control group due to exposure [choice: McNemar-Test, P=1.00; valuation: Wilcoxon,
P<0.01; comparison: Wilcoxon P<0.01]. Also, we confirm that children who had
to work to receive the food displayed a significantly larger increase in liking as com-
pared to those who received the apple unconditionally [choice: chi2=5.22, P=0.07;
valuation: M-WT, z= 1.75, P=0.08; comparison: M-WT, z= 1.95, P=0.05].
Table 2.3.1: Average difference in liking between assessments
CO EL EF CO vs. EL+EFc EL vs. EFc
Choice
Short-term a 0.000 0,103 0,082 0.074 0.348
Long-term b 0.063 0.191 0.230 0.044 0.383
Valuation
Short-term 0.417 0.618 0,721 0.0794 0.894
Long-term 0.833 0.706 0,705 0.3559 0.921
Comparison
Short-term 0.354 0.971 0,672 0.0516 0.161
Long-term 0.708 1.294 1,115 0.0474 0.033
aDifference between the measure of liking in second assessment and baseline (short-term)
b Difference between the measure of liking in third assessment and baseline (long-term)
c P-values based on a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for ordinal variables.
Fisher’s exact test is used for binary variables.
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Figure 2.3.2: Short-term effects
Short-term effects displayed as the difference in the three measures of liking - a.
choice: change in percentage, b. valuation: change on 4-point scale, and c.
comparison: change in 5 comparisons - from the 1st and the 2nd assessment.
Results of a comparison to the baseline are reported above the bars, we report
results of a McNemar Test for choice and a Wilcoxon test for valuation and
comparison. Results for a comparison between treated and control are indicated by
brackets. We conduct a Chi2 test for choice and a U-test for valuation and
comparison. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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To assess the long-term effect of our intervention, we returned to the schools 4
weeks after the second assessment. Figure 2.3.3 displays the average difference in
liking between the first and the third assessment for both groups. Again, we find ev-
idence for a significant exposure effect in our control group [choice: McNemar-Test,
P=0.31; valuation: Wilcoxon, P<0.01; comparison: Wilcoxon P<0.01]. Further-
more, we observe a significant treatment effect for choice [Chi2: p=0.04] and com-
parison [U-test: p=0.05], but no significant treatment effect for valuation [U-test:
p=0.36]. The non significant treatment effect measure with this outcome is mainly
driven by a larger increase in valuation for the control group in the long-term, but
the valuation of dried apple is enhanced in the two treatment groups as well.
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Figure 2.3.3: Long-term effects
Long-term effects displayed as the difference in the three measures of liking - a.
choice: change in percentage, b. valuation: change on 4-point scale, and c. com-
parison: change in 5 comparisons - from the 1st and the 3rd assessment. Results
of a comparison to the baseline are reported above the bars, we report results of a
McNemar Test for choice and a Wilcoxon test for valuation and comparison. Results
for a comparison between treated and control are indicated by brackets. We conduct
a Chi2 test for choice and a U-test for valuation and comparison. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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2.3.2 Regression Analysis
We analyse the impact of the treatment, i.e. receiving the food as reward, and of
effort on the liking for dried apples in the second and third assessments choices , by
estimating linear models for the 3 outcomes described in the previous section (choice,
valuation and comparison). We estimate models of the following form:
Y t+1i = β0 + β1Treatmenti + β2Highefforti + Y
t
i + γiSchooli + εi
Where Y t+1i denotes an outcome measure for liking of dried apples in later assess-
ments (second or third), Treatmenti is the dummy variable for the randomly as-
signed experimental treatment of receiving the food as reward and Highefforti is
the dummy variable for assignment to the high-effort treatment. β1 and β2 are the
coefficients of interest. As control variables we include the baseline level of liking
of dried apples Y ti and a dummy for the school Schooli. εi is an idiosyncratic error
term. We estimate all models using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator, with
estimate standard errors robust to clustering at the class level. Due to the relatively
small number of clusters (11 classes), the wild cluster bootstrap approach proposed
by Cameron et al. [13] need to be used used to estimate the clustered standard errors,
which requires the estimation of a linear model. The results from different methods
to address the clustered nature of our data can be found in Appendix 2.4.7, Table
2.4.6.
Columns 1 to 3 show the results for the short-term effects and support our findings
from the non-parametric analysis. The treatment coefficient indicates the main effect
of food rewards, which is significantly different from the control group in all three
measures of liking. The long-term effects reported in columns 4 to 6 also support our
prior findings and indicate persistent treatment effects in two of our three measures,
i.e. in choice and in comparison. Effort justification theory predicts a stronger
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treatment effect for children who have to provide high effort as compared to those
who only have to provide low effort to receive the food reward. The coefficient
for high effort is small and not significant except for comparison in the short-term
analysis where it is actually significantly negative (contradicting the prediction of
effort justification). Thus, we find no support that the observed effect of using food
as a reward on food liking is driven by effort justification. Evaluative conditioning
is a more plausible explanation for the observed treatment effect.
As mentioned above, treatment was assigned at the class level and we must ac-
count for the nested structure of the data. Considering each class as a cluster,
we find the intra cluster correlation (ICC) within the classes to be generally low:
for all outcome measures the ICC never reaches a value above 0.1 (baseline ICC:
valuation=0.000; choice=0.02; comparison=0.09). In Appendix 2.4.7 Table 2.4.6,
compared to the regular cluster method [48] [38], the use of wild bootstrap clusters
slightly increases the standard errors and results into the loss of significance particu-
larly for the effortful group. Appenidx 2.4.8 reports placebo regression for the other
foods used in the assessment sessions.
2.4 Conclusion
Previous literature aimed at finding tools to improve children’s dietary liking and
consumption. The focus has mainly been on the use of incentives and rewards for
the consumption of fruits and vegetables [6, 33, 35]. Other experimental studies have
proven the positive impact of using behavioural interventions, as the use of healthy
defaults options or creative presentation of foods [40, 45, 26]. In an experimental
study among children, we find evidence that using a food as a reward and incentive
increases the liking of this foods. The observed treatment effect seems most in line
119
Table 2.3.2: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Short-term) (Long-term)
Choice Valuation Comparison Choice Valuation Comparison
Treatment 0.0883∗∗ 0.297∗ 0.567∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗ -0.0624 0.543∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.056) (0.001) (0.021) (0.795) (0.000)
High-effort -0.0282 -0.0301 -0.250∗ 0.0285 -0.195 -0.139
(0.455) (0.838) (0.065) (0.658) (0.281) (0.375)
Baseline : 0.540∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗ 0.526∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000)
School 1 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
School 2 -0.114∗∗ 0.150 0.338∗∗ -0.00807 0.0694 0.438∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.276) (0.017) (0.904) (0.759) (0.010)
School 3 -0.0809∗ 0.177 0.147 -0.0686 0.504∗ 0.222
(0.081) (0.110) (0.193) (0.405) (0.053) (0.200)
Constant 0.109∗∗∗ 1.206∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 1.785∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000)
N 177 177 177 177 177 177
Notes: p-values clustered on the class level in Columns (1), (2) and (3) refer to the second
assessment columns (4), (5) and (6) to the follow-up. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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with evaluative conditioning, where individuals attach an increased value to a food
that they previously received in the positive context of being rewarded. Exerting
more effort to receive the reward was not associated with higher increase in lik-
ing. The evidence provided here bears a number of implications that ought to guide
further research but should also be considered by parents and policy-makers alike.
Parents might refrain from using sweet and energy dense foods to reward their chil-
dren for desirable behaviour, introducing less liked and healthier foods as a reward
or in positive situations.
Future health interventions may try to leverage this effect to increase liking for
healthy foods by using them as rewards. Future research should explore whether this
mechanism can be observed in a broader social context and affects liking for foods
that are offered during special occasions such as Christmas. It should also explore the
impact of introducing foods in negative situations to test whether this would induce
a negative association of the food. More research should also analyse whether the
use of a disliked food item as reward could improve its liking, as a tool to reduce
picky eating. Also, it could be explored whether a different number of repetitions
of the treatment (using food as a reward) would have a different impact on liking.
Increasing the number the repetition might indeed induce boredom, cancelling the
novelty and the positive impact of the feeling of achievement associated to the food
reward.
Finally, the increased liking for dried apple could be partially driven by experimenter




2.4.1 Letters and Leaflets (communication with parents and
schools)
This section presents the translated version from German of the letters and leaflets












Jun.-Prof. Dr. Marina Schröder 
Telefon  +49 221 470-6939 




























































Universitätsstrasse 22a (SSC) 
 
 
Universität zu Köln 





































Dear head of school, 
 
We are a team of social scientists from the University of Cologne and the 
University of Edinburgh. We are contacting you because we would like your 
school to take part in our study about children’s dietary choices. The study is part 
of a larger project funded by the European Union involving leading universities 
across Europe. The aim of the project is to understand the drivers of dietary 
choices in order to design tools to encourage healthier eating-habits. The project 
involves scientists from different disciplines such as neuroscience, psychology 
and economics. If you are interested in knowing a little more about the projects 
you can find some information online at the website:  
http://www.nudge-it.eu/ 
 
This specific project focuses on food preferences of first graders. We would like 
to conduct a study in your school, ideally in April and May 2016. The study would 
consist of 8 visits to your first grade classes, lasting between 15 to 45 minutes 
each. During the visits we will ask children to complete different tasks (mazes 
and counting tasks) in class and we will ask children to taste various food items.  
 
The project was reviewed and approved by an academic ethical review 
committee, following the guidelines of the European Commission. Upon your 
approval, we will distribute a leaflet to parents informing them about our intention 
to carry our study in your school. Parents will be given the option to opt out their 


























the study. All the information we collect will be stored safely and securely and in accordance to 
our data protection guidelines. Each child will be given an identifier (a number), that will allow us 
to keep all information anonymous. All data collected will only be used for research purposes. At 
the end of the study, we will share with you the results of our research to improve children’s 
eating habits and a booklet summarizing the findings of the study. 
 
We would be most grateful if you would agree to a personal meeting, in which we present our 
research plan to you and discuss a potential cooperation with your school. Please contact us by 
phone (0221-470-6939) or by email (marina.schroeder@uni-koeln.de) to schedule an 
appointment, which is of course without any obligation for your school.  
 






Prof. Dr. Michèle Belot   Jun. Prof. Dr. Marina Schröder   Martina Vecchi 
School of Economics  School of Management,    School of Economics 
University of Edinburgh  Economics and Social Sciences  University of Edinburgh 






















Figure 2.4.1: Information for the Schools
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Jun.-Prof. Dr. Marina Schröder 
Telefon  +49 221 470-6939 




























































































Dear Parent/children caretaker 
 
We are a team of scientists from the University of Cologne and the 
University of Edinburgh. We would like to invite your child to take part in a 
research study on food preferences, that we intend to conduct at [NAME 
OF THE SCHOOL] on [DATES]. We would like to ask children to taste 
different foods and to indicate their liking of these foods. Furthermore, we 
would ask the children to solve simple tasks.  
 
The study is part of a larger project funded by the European Union involving 
leading universities across Europe, which aims at understanding the drivers 
of food preferences at different ages. If you are interested in the details, you 
can visit our web page http://nudge-it.eu/. The project has been reviewed and 
approved by an academic ethical review committee, following the guidelines of the 
European Commission. 
 
In case you have any questions about the project, please do not hesitate to contact 
us by telephone (0221-470-6939) or e-mail (marina.schroeder@uni-koeln.de). In 
case your child has any dietary restriction (due to an allergy or an intolerance) or 
if you do not want your child to participate in the study, please fill in the attached 
sheet and hand it back to the class teacher by XXXXXX.  
 






Prof. Dr. Michèle Belot   Jun.-Prof. Dr. Marina Schröder  Martina Vecchi 
School of Economics  Wirtschafts- und Sozial- School of Economics 
University of Edinburgh  wissenschaftliche Fakultät University of Edinburgh 


























Does your child have any dietary restriction? 
⌊ Yes ⌋              ⌊ No⌋ 






Exclusion of your child from this study 
 










________________        ________________________________ 
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Jun.-Prof. Dr. Marina Schröder 
Telefon  +49 221 470-6939 






























































































Dear Parent/children caretaker 
 
We are a team of social scientists from the University of Cologne and the 
University of Edinburgh and we are conducting a research study on food 
preferences at [NAME OF THE SCHOOL.. We would like to invite you to 
answer a few questions about your child and we would really appreciate if 
you could answer as many as you can in order to help us conducting our 
research on food preferences. All the information collected will only be used 
for research purposes. Each child will be given a unique identifier (a 
number), that will allow us to keep all information anonymous. 
 
We would be grateful if you could fill in the small questionnaire enclosed 










Prof. Dr. Michèle Belot   Jun.-Prof. Dr. Marina Schröder  Martina Vecchi 
School of Economics  Wirtschafts- und Sozial- School of Economics 
University of Edinburgh  wissenschaftliche Fakultät University of Edinburgh 


























STUDY “Food Preferences Among Children” 
 
We would be grateful if you could fill in this short survey and return it to the school by 
[DATE] 
Identification     ____________________________________  
Child’s age     ____________________________________  
Child’s Gender:   female    male   
Approximate Child’s height in cm         ____________________________________  
ApproximateChild’s weight in kilos      ____________________________________  
How often does your child eat the following foods? 
Dried Fruits  
 
 







Never              Occasionally (once or twice a month)          Often (once or twice a week)                   Daily 
 
 




Never              Occasionally (once or twice a month)          Often (once or twice a week)                   Daily 
 
 





Never              Occasionally (once or twice a month)          Often (once or twice a week)                   Daily 
 






























Please list your child’s favourite foods: 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
At which occasion would your child eat sweets? 
 Only at special occasions (birthdays, …) 
 As a reward for good behaviour  
 As a reward for eating her/his meal 
 No specific occasion; he is eating sweets from time to time 
 S/he never eats sweets 
 
Do you use rewards to encourage specific behaviours from your children?  
Yes     No  
 




How often do you use rewards to encourage specific behaviours from your children?  
 
 
Never              Occasionally (once or twice a month)          Often (once or twice a week)                   Daily 
 
Would you like to receive information regarding the results of this research project? 
 
Yes     No  
 
If Yes, please indicate below an adress (email or postal) to which we can send the information 





Figure 2.4.3: Survey for Parents
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2.4.2 Task and Questionnaires
This section presents the translated version from German of the experimental mate-
rial.









             
              
             











             
              
             




Figure 2.4.4: Example of the task used
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Figure 2.4.6: Questionnaire to assess the liking of the foods
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Which food would you would like to receive as a snack? 
 
Figure 2.4.7: Questionnaire to determine the choice of the snack
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QUESTION 1 
What would you prefer to eat? 
 
QUESTION 2 




What would you prefer to eat? 
 
QUESTION 4 














































What would you prefer to eat? 
 
QUESTION 6 
What would you prefer to eat? 
 
QUESTION 7 
What would you prefer to eat? 
 
QUESTION 8 








































Figure 2.4.9: Questionnaire to assess the liking of the foods
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2.4.3 Nutritional Profiles
After assessing children’s liking for 10 snacks using the three outcome measures used
in the experiment (dried apples, dried apricots, dried prunes, wholegrain crackers,
rice cakes, carrot sticks, pears, grapes, drinking yoghurt and natural yogurt), we
chose the 4 snacks with similar and more moderate rating. As food reward, we chose
the one with the most moderate liking. Those foods were selected because of their
nutritional profile: as crackers we used spelt and quinoa wholegrain crackers, the
yogurt was natural yogurt without added sugar and the two dried fruits were chosen
because they contribute to the RDA for fruits and do not have added sugar (even if
they have a high content of sugar).
In table 2.4.1 we report the nutritional profile of the foods.
2.4.4 Correlation Between Different Outcome Measures and
Transitivity of Preferences
Table 2.4.2 shows the correlation between the 3 outcomes used to assess the liking
of the 4 foods tasted during the assessments. The estimates of the Pearson’s corre-
lation coefficient between the different outcome measures for each of the foods show
a positive correlation in all the assessments (the coefficients in the bordered boxes),
with the majority of coefficients identifying a moderate or strong correlation. The
correlation between liking of different foods is generally negative.
Table 2.4.3 reports the number of times the transitivity of preferences in the hypo-
thetical choice between two of the snacks was violated. In each assessment session
each child could violate transitivity 24 times, but the maximum amount of intransi-
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.4.3: Violations of Transitivity
Average Std. Dev. Maxium
1st Assessment 0.505 1.342 6
2nd Assessment 0.949 1.421 7
3rd Assessment 1.070 1.616 7
Total 2.523 3.173676 15
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2.4.5 Attrition
In the main text we present the analysis excluding children who were not in class all
3 assessments. Such analysis yields unbiased estimates as long as children who were
not in class during all the 3 assessments are missing at random [5]. In table 2.4.4 we
present the results from the linear probability model predicting missing values in the
data based on the treatment assignment or liking at baseline. This analysis shows
that missing observations do not depend on those variables and are hence missing
at random.
Table 2.4.4: Linear probability model predicting missing values in the data














Constant 0.186∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.007)
N 214 203 206 205
Notes: binary dependent variable =1 if at least 1 of 3 outcomes is missind during at least 1
assessment
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.4.6 Regression with the full sample
Table 2.4.5 presents the results of the OLS analysis of the impact of treatment and
effort on liking of the food reward without the exclusion of children not in class all
the 3 assessments.
Table 2.4.5: Regression Results with the Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Short-term) (Long-term)
Choice Valuation Comparison Choice Valuation Comparison
Treatment -0.0129 0.264∗ -0.102 -0.00135 -0.0713 0.0248
(0.717) (0.079) (0.170) (0.970) (0.774) (0.832)
High-Effort 0.0155 -0.0895 0.0135 -0.00563 -0.209 -0.0347
(0.539) (0.611) (0.854) (0.880) (0.345) (0.765)
Baseline 0.256∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.0568 0.646∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.000) (0.000) (0.499) (0.000) (0.000)
School 1 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
School 2 0.0275 0.0479 0.0242 -0.0212 0.346 0.0118
(0.477) (0.684) (0.772) (0.671) (0.136) (0.930)
School 3 -0.00290 0.175 0.0254 -0.0331 0.478∗∗ 0.0415
(0.920) (0.174) (0.797) (0.471) (0.033) (0.790)
Constant 0.0235 0.312∗∗ 0.229∗∗ 0.0568 0.602∗∗ 0.199
(0.416) (0.048) (0.034) (0.112) (0.034) (0.168)
N 195 191 194 192 188 191
Notes: p-values clustered on the class level in Columns (1), (2) and (3) refer to the second
assessment columns (4), (5) and (6) to the follow-up. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.4.7 Results from linear regression with different standard
errors
In table 2.4.6 is presented the OLS regression analysis performed in the main text,
with the use of three different methods for computing the standard errors. It shows
the results with clustered standard errors on the class level following [38], clustered
standard errors on the class level using bootstrapping method by [14] [13] and het-
eroscedastic robust unclustered standard errors. The use of the 3 methods does not
lead to significantly different results.
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Table 2.4.6: Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Short-term) (Long-term)
Choice Valuation Comparison Choice Valuation Comparison
Reward 0.0883 0.29 0.567 0.123 -0.0624 0.543
(0.011) (0.056) (0.001) (0.021) (0.795) (0.001)
[0.054] [0.182] [0.030] [0.062] [0.806] [0.001]
{0.140} {0.107} {0.002} {0.103} {0.748} { 0.007}
High-effort -0.0282 -0.0301 -0.250 0.0285 -0.195 -0.139
(0.455) (0.838) (0.065) (0.658) (0.281) (0.375)
[0.192] [0.842] [0.132] [0.722] [0.422] [0.492]
{0.599} {0.874} {0.173} {0.700} {0.316} {0.558}
Baseline of: 0.540 0.609 0.496 0.403 0.509 0.526
(0.002) (<0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (<0.001) (<0.001)
[<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001]
{<0.001} {<0.001} {<0.001} {0.008} {<0.001} {<0.001}
School 1 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
School 2 -0.114 0.150 0.338 -0.00807 0.0694 0.438
(0.020) (0.276) (0.017) (0.904) (0.759) (0.010)
[0.122] [0.456] [0.078] [0.810] [0.752] [0.060]
{0.068} {0.504} {0.094} {0.925} {0.757} {0.075}
School 3 -0.0809 0.177 0.147 -0.0686 0.504 0.222
(0.081) (0.110) (0.193) (0.405) (0.053) (0.200)
[0.274] [0.166] [0.284] [0.598] [0.174] [0.408]
{0.202} {0.393} {0.439} {0.367} {0.017} {0.291}
Constant 0.109 1.206 0.647 0.137 1.785 0.910
(0.009) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.029) (<0.001) (<0.001)
[0.212] [<0.001] [<0.001] [<0.001] [0.008] [<0.001]
{0.061} {<0.001} {<0.001} {0.062} {<0.001} {<0.001}
N 177 177 177 177 177 177
Notes: p-values below the coefficients based on: () clustered standard errors on the class level
following [38]; [] clustered standard errors on the class level using bootstrapping method by [14]
[13]; heteroscedastic robust unclustered standard errors. P-values below 0.1 in bold. Columns
(1), (2) and (3) refer to the second assessment, columns (4), (5) and (6) to the follow-up.
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2.4.8 Results from linear regression with different foods
This section presents the OLS regression analysis of the impact of the treatment and
of higher effort on the liking for the 3 food tasted in the assessment sessions but
not used in the treatment sessions (placebo foods). The regression analysis for the
placebo foods shows a non significant effect of the treatment and of higher effort on
their liking, as expected.
Table 2.4.7: Regression Results for Dried Apricots
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Short-term) (Long-term)
Choice Valuation Comparison Choice Valuation Comparison
Treatment -0.0139 0.203 -0.0921 0.000586 -0.0583 0.0542
(0.727) (0.151) (0.165) (0.988) (0.812) (0.633)
High- effort 0.0196 -0.0913 0.0186 -0.00561 -0.180 -0.0399
(0.478) (0.641) (0.803) (0.889) (0.440) (0.750)
Baseline: 0.254∗ 0.687∗∗∗ 0.548∗∗∗ 0.0533 0.630∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.000) (0.000) (0.530) (0.000) (0.000)
School 1 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
School 2 0.0304 0.0273 0.0651 -0.0231 0.402∗ 0.0292
(0.485) (0.823) (0.459) (0.674) (0.086) (0.838)
School 3 -0.00377 0.206 0.0694 -0.0386 0.446∗∗ 0.0497
(0.907) (0.131) (0.497) (0.437) (0.041) (0.749)
Constant 0.0255 0.379∗∗ 0.187∗ 0.0618 0.635∗∗ 0.163
(0.442) (0.029) (0.079) (0.123) (0.024) (0.269)
N 177 176 177 177 176 177
Notes: p-values clustered on the class level in Columns (1), (2) and (3) refer to the second
assessment columns (4), (5) and (6) to the follow-up. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.4.8: Regression Results for Natural Yogurt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Short-term) (Long-term)
Choice Valuation Comparison Choice Valuation Comparison
Treatment -0.0467 -0.137 -0.157 -0.0812 -0.116 -0.313∗∗
(0.702) (0.461) (0.268) (0.470) (0.467) (0.043)
High-effort -0.0528 -0.106 0.230∗ -0.0263 0.0562 0.223
(0.625) (0.461) (0.067) (0.809) (0.730) (0.127)
Baseline: 0.466∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
School 1 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
School 2 0.129 0.238 0.238∗∗ 0.118 0.207 0.138
(0.285) (0.278) (0.045) (0.281) (0.255) (0.282)
School 3 0.142 0.250 0.162 0.136 0.250 0.0969
(0.281) (0.270) (0.233) (0.215) (0.230) (0.542)
Constant 0.183 1.387∗∗∗ 0.546∗∗ 0.204 1.533∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗
(0.245) (0.001) (0.018) (0.105) (0.000) (0.028)
N 176 170 177 176 170 177
Notes: p-values clustered on the class level in Columns (1), (2) and (3) refer to the second
assessment columns (4), (5) and (6) to the follow-up. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.4.9: Regression Results for Cracker
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Short-term) (Long-term)
Choice Valuation Comparison Choice Valuation Comparison
Treatment 0.0231 -0.0996 -0.155 -0.00902 -0.0244 -0.260∗∗
(0.851) (0.166) (0.158) (0.934) (0.552) (0.012)
High-effort 0.0553 0.0584 -0.00995 -0.00966 -0.0606 -0.0266
(0.627) (0.594) (0.927) (0.928) (0.337) (0.870)
Baseline: 0.560∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.0287 0.656∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.408) (0.000)
School 1 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
School 2 -0.102 0.0172 -0.147 -0.121 -0.0288 -0.235∗∗
(0.397) (0.872) (0.203) (0.167) (0.535) (0.032)
School 3 -0.0761 0.0984 -0.0759 -0.0434 0.0131 -0.0311
(0.571) (0.434) (0.454) (0.700) (0.772) (0.821)
Constant 0.158 2.545∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗ 0.197∗ 3.857∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗
(0.294) (0.000) (0.018) (0.056) (0.000) (0.002)
N 176 173 177 176 173 177
Notes: p-values clustered on the class level in Columns (1), (2) and (3) refer to the second
assessment columns (4), (5) and (6) to the follow-up. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 3. Stress and Food
Preferences: A Lab Experiment
with Mothers
We present evidence from a laboratory experiment on the effects of stress induced in
the lab on food consumption among 196 low-income mothers in the UK. In the stress
treatment, subjects were asked to complete a 10 minute block of short incentivised
decision tasks designed to mimic stressors often experienced by low-socioeconomic
mothers. We evaluate the effects of the stressful task on immediate and planned food
consumption, and specifically on the nutritional content of the foods chosen. Immedi-
ate consumption is measured by in-laboratory consumption of a low calorie and high
calorie snack; planned consumption is measured by incentivised food purchases in a
specifically designed food choice tool. Measurements of participants’ salivary cortisol
and heart rate were taken over the course of the experimental sessions to assess the
stressfulness of the stress task. Contrary to previous findings in the literature, we
find no evidence of an effect of the stress induced in the lab on the nutritional content
of immediate or planned food choices. When controlling for the performance in the
stress task though, we find a higher calorie intake among those performing poorly,
Michèle Belot, Jonathan James, Martina Vecchi, Nicolai Vitt
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suggesting a role of failure in eating behaviour.
3.1 Introduction
The spread of obesity in developed nations over the past decades has disproportion-
ally affected lower socioeconomic groups as they face a larger risk of overweight and
obesity [21, 9]. These groups experience more stress and negative affective states,
which may lead to short-sighted and less attentive decision-making [16, 6]. Higher
levels of stress and a lack of tools to cope with stressful situations among low socioe-
conomic groups are among the factors suggested to cause this socioeconomic gradient
in obesity [4, 8].
Descriptive evidence has shown (some) individuals exposed to chronic stressors to
have a less balanced diet and an increased calorie intake [29]. Experimental evidence
regarding the impact of acute stress on dietary choices is somewhat mixed. Lab
experiments by Zellner et al. [32], Habhab et al. [14] and Rutters et al. [25] have
shown acute stress to shift individuals’ food choices towards a less healthy diet with
higher consumption of sugars and fat and a higher total calorie intake.1 A study
by Appelhans et al. [3] on the other hand has found no evidence of such a shift
and Zellner et al. [33] have shown male undergraduate students to make healthier
choices when exposed to an experimental stressor. Gender [33], emotional eating
[24], anxiety following the stressor and disinhibition [25] have been reported to af-
fect the susceptibility of individuals’ diet to acute stress. Studies by Epel et al. [12]
and Newman et al. [23] furthermore suggest cortisol might play a vital role in the
link between stress and dietary behaviours, their findings show significant changes
in food choices only among participants with a strong cortisol response to stress.
1Table 3.6.1 in Appendix 3.6.1 reports an overview of the previous experimental literature.
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One potential cause of this variation in cortisol reactivity and in dietary responses
to stress is the abilitiy to cope with stress [23].
This study examines the relationship between acute stress2 , coping abilities and
dietary choices, with a focus on low-income mothers. We focus on mothers as they
play a crucial role in families’ dietary choices, often they are in charge of the family’s
food shopping and meal preparation [15]. Maternal food choices hence have consid-
erable spillover effects on the diet of their children [19]. We furthermore focus on
low-income families as they are subject to higher risks of overweight and obesity [9].
Using a lab experiment, we study the effects of acute stress and coping abilities on
food choices, both in the context of immediate consumption (a “snack choice”) and
planned consumption (a “food shopping choice”). A novel stress protocol was de-
signed to mimic stressors often experienced by low-socioeconomic mothers: making
decisions with consequences for others (e.g. for the family) subject to financial and
time constraints as well as distractions (e.g. by children requiring attention). Pre-
vious laboratory experiments examining the impact of acute stress on food choices
have used artificial and unrealistic stressors (solving arithmetical tasks, preparing a
speech for an audience etc.). The cortisol and perceived stress responses to these
stressors is marked, but in our opinion does not resemble the responses to stressors
often faced by our subjects. Also, the focus of previous laboratory experiments was
on immediate consumption choices. Food choices made in supermarkets and shops,
however, are not aimed at immediate consumption and hence are based on different
decision processes.
We propose two channels through which stress might affect food choices: (1) by
2Acute stress is the most common form of stress. It comes from demands and pressures of the
recent past and anticipated demands and pressures of the near future. It is defined in contrast to
chronic stress, which results from repeated exposure to situations that lead to the release of stress
hormones.
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affecting individuals’ preferences and (2) by affecting their ability to make sound de-
cisions. Hormonal responses to stress have been frequently cited to cause cravings for
energy-dense “comfort foods” and hence a (temporary) change in food preferences
[1]. Both acute and chronic stress stimulate the release of cortisol (in humans) or
of other glucocorticoids (in animals) in the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA)
axis which in turn have been shown to affect food intake of rats [31, 10] and humans
[28, 13] when administered exogenously. These stress-induced temporary food crav-
ings constitute an endogenous change of individuals’ food preferences.
On the other hand, stress can be a drain on resources such as mental energy and
time, which in a bounded rationality context are necessary to make sound decisions
[2]. Low-socioeconomic groups are already depleted of their cognitive capacity, since
poverty concerns consume mental resources [20, 16]. A stress-induced drain on re-
sources is hence expected to amplify the impairment of decision-making processes
due to scarcity, as described by Mullainathan and Shafir [22]. Experimental evidence
shows cognitive overload to weaken self-control and lead to less healthy food choices
[26]. Stress has furthermore been found to temporarily alter time preferences and
risk attitudes [11, 17] thereby affecting the ability to make decisions which optimize
long-term utility.
The relative importance of these two proposed channels is expected to differ be-
tween food shopping and immediate consumption choices. Stress-induced food crav-
ings (first channel) are likely to play a somewhat smaller role for shopping than
for immediate consumption choices. As shopping choices require planning of future
consumption and often involve larger choice sets, impaired decision making (second
channel) would be expected to affect these choices more than the less complex con-
sumption choices. Comparison of the impact of stress on immediate and planned
consumption will therefore allow us to assess the relative importance of the chan-
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nels proposed. We furthermore randomly vary the complexity of the experimental
food shopping choice, allowing us to examine the relevance of the second channel for
planned consumption choices.
To study the impact of acute stress on dietary choices and to understand the
mechanisms linking them, we conducted a lab experiment with 196 mothers in
Colchester (UK). We employed a 2x2 experimental design with a pre-assignment
of experimental conditions at the lab session level. In a first stage, sessions were
pre-assigned to the stress treatment or to the control group. In the stress treatment,
participants were asked to complete a 10-minute block of short incentivised decision
tasks. While the tasks were completed individually, incentives were based on the
joint performance of randomly assigned “social groups” of two participants to elicit
social stress. Incorrect answers and incomplete tasks were penalized. Time pressure
was induced by the tight overall time limit as well as by time penalties and time lim-
its per task. Short incentivised knowledge questions appeared randomly on screen
over the course of the task block to induce additional stress through distractions. In
the control group, participants were asked to read several short texts on a variety
of topics and answer simple non-incentivised questions about these texts. The effec-
tiveness of our stress protocol was tested using survey questions on the participants’
perceptions of the tasks as well as the change in heart rate and salivary cortisol in
response to the tasks.
In a second stage, sessions were further pre-assigned to one of two food shopping
environment treatments: a simple or a complex choice environment. If stress affects
dietary choices by impairing individuals’ decision-making, a more complex choice
environment is expected to lead to less healthy food shopping choices. Participants
were asked to use a fixed budget to purchase food items in a “virtual supermarket”,
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a computer-based tool similar to online supermarkets. A variety of high-calorie and
low-calorie food and drink items was available to choose from with prices matching
market prices at a local supermarket. The presentation of options varied between
the two treatment groups: in the simple choice environment, items were displayed
in 10 different categories (e.g. fruit, vegetable, dairy etc.). In the complex choice
environment, items were displayed in a long list, grouped by category but without
labelling of categories. The nutritional content of the chosen basket of food and drink
items is used to determine the impact of acute stress and the choice environment on
the healthiness of food shopping choices.
Following the before mentioned food shopping choice, participants were given a five
minute break and then asked to complete a questionnaire on demographics and other
control variables. A choice of snacks involving high- and low-calorie snack foods was
placed in bowls on each participant’s desk for consumption during the break and dur-
ing the completion of the questionnaire. The amount of each snack type consumed
by each participant was recorded by weighing the snack bowls before and after the
snacks were available. The resulting quantities are used to determine the impact of
acute stress on the healthiness of snacking choices.
Participants in the stress group perceived the task as significantly more stressful
than the control group; this is supported by a significant rise in their heart rate
during the task. However, we find no statistically significant effects of this acute
stressor on participants’ immediate food consumption (“snack choice”) or planned
food consumption (“shopping choice”). Our results suggest that day-to-day stress
per se does not affect dietary choices. When controlling for the performance in the
stress task though, we find a higher calorie intake among those poorly, suggesting a
role of failure in eating behaviour.
Additional data collected during this lab experiment [5] show chronic maternal stress
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during pregnancy to be linked with less healthy children’s food preference and food
consumption patterns. Taken together, these findings indicate that a mother’s stress
has little impact on her dietary choices, but can have a significant impact on the
development of children’s food preferences and hence their future food behaviours.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 presents the experimental design.
Section 3.3 describes the data collected during the experiment. In section 3.4 we
present our empirical analysis and our results. Section 3.5 shows explorative evidence
on the combined dietary impact of acute stress and failure. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Experimental Design
To study the relationship between maternal stress and food preferences, we con-
ducted a lab experiment with 227 low-income mothers in Colchester, UK.3 The
sessions for this experiment took place between 15 October and 19 October 2018 in
the experimental laboratory of the University of Essex (EssexLab). Sessions lasted
approximately two hours and started at 10:30 am, 2:00 pm and 5:00 pm. We employ
a between subject design, with participants only attending one session. The session
slots were pre-assigned to the four experimental conditions. Additional survey data
not presented in this chapter were collected during this lab experiment, to study
the impact of chronic maternal stress during pregnancy on children’s food preference
and food consumption patterns [5].
The experimental design was pre-tested in June 2018 using a sample of 50 low-income
3The lab experiment was conducted with ethical approval by the European Univer-
sity Institute and the University of Edinburgh. The experiment and the hypotheses
tested in this study and in Belot et al. [5] were pre-registered in the AEA RCT reg-
istry under the following trial ID: AEARCTR-0003410. Details can be found under
https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3410/history/35937.
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mothers in Florence, Italy4. Initially this pre-test was planned as the main exper-
iment, but recruitment of participants proved too difficult to reach the necessary
sample size.
3.2.1 Sample and Recruitment
We recruited low-income mothers living in the area of Colchester. The specific
eligibility criteria for participation in the study were:
1. Aged between 18 and 45
2. Fluent in English
3. Being a mother whose youngest child is aged between 2 and 12 years old
4. Net annual household income below £35.000
5. Does not hold a university degree and is not currently enrolled at university
6. Has not been pregnant in the past 6 months
7. Has no allergies or intolerances to foods used for the snack consumption choice
8. Does not have medical conditions which can affect diet
Participants were recruited using multiple channels. A direct marketing agency sent
personalized letters to women in the Colchester area who match our age restriction
and live in a low SES neighbourhood. The study was furthermore promoted to the
participants of a previous experiment. Examples of the recruitment materials used
4The pre-test was conducted with ethical approval by the European University In-
stitute and the University of Edinburgh and was pre-registered in the AEA RCT reg-
istry under the following trial ID: AEARCTR-0003089. Details can be found under
https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/3089/history/30976.
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to advertise the study can be found in Appendix A. Those interested in participa-
tion were invited to complete an online screening questionnaire or to contact the
experiment team by telephone. Eligible mothers were then invited to one of the
experimental sessions; they received an information leaflet and a consent form by
post.
31 of the 227 experiment participants did not fulfil all eligibility criteria and are
hence excluded from the analysis, a sample of 196 low-income mothers remains for
our analysis, see Table 3.2.1 for details.
Table 3.2.1: Sample size
Stress Control Total
Categorized Long Categorized Long
Total: 63 58 60 46 227
Not eligible due to:
- Child’s age 0 1 1 0 2
- HH income 0 0 1 1 2
- University degree 0 0 1 0 1
- Food allergy / intolerance 1 2 1 3 7
- Medical condition (diet-related) 2 0 0 0 2
- Depression 2 6 7 2 17
Eligible: 58 49 49 40 196
3.2.2 Randomisation
We conducted 15 experimental sessions with 13 to 18 participants per session. The
15 sessions were spread over a period of five days. The experiment follows a 2x2
experimental design resulting in four experimental conditions:
1. Stress Task & Simple Shopping Choice
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2. Stress Task & Complex Shopping Choice
3. Control Task & Simple Shopping Choice
4. Control Task & Complex Shopping Choice
These experimental conditions were pre-assigned at the session level aiming to en-
sure balance in terms of day of the week and time of day. When signing up for
participation in the experiment, participants were asked to indicate their preferred
session slots, but were not informed of the treatments associated with each time slot.
If participants indicated availability for multiple slots, they were assigned to one of
the slots solely based on scheduling concerns.
3.2.3 Procedure
Upon arrival at our lab facilities, participants’ body weight and body height without
shoes and heavy clothing was measured by trained lab assistants. Throughout the
experimental session, participants were asked to wear an armband monitoring their
heart rate using an optical sensor. At the beginning of the experimental session,
participants were asked to provide a first saliva sample (9 mins before the start of
the stress / control task).
Following this, participants were asked to complete a 10-minute task. The nature
of the task depended on the session’s randomly assigned experimental condition. In
conditions 1) and 2) (detailed above), i.e. the stress treatment groups, participants
were asked to complete an incentivised task aimed at inducing mild stress. In con-
ditions 3) and 4), i.e. the control groups, participants were asked to complete a task
of similar nature but with no stress inducing features. Detailed descriptions of these
tasks can be found below.
Following the first task, participants were asked to complete a “food shopping” task.
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They were given a fixed budget of £30 to purchase grocery items in a “virtual su-
permarket”, a computer-based tool similar to online supermarkets. The complexity
of the food shopping environment depended on the experimental condition assigned
to the session. In conditions 1) and 3) (detailed above), i.e. the simple shopping
choice, products were listed separately in 10 different food categories. In conditions
2) and 4), i.e. the complex shopping choice, products were shown in a single long
list. Details of this food shopping choice are outlined below.
After the “food shopping” task, participants were asked to provide a second saliva
sample (29 mins after the start of the stress / control task) and then given a five
minute break. After the break, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire
on demographics, family characteristics and behaviours, which might affect cortisol
levels. During the break and the time given to complete the first questionnaire,
participants were given permission to consume the snacks provided on their desks:
high-calorie blueberry mini-muffins and low-calorie apple slices (not labelled with
their calorie content or in any other way). After 20 minutes, the bowls of snacks
were collected.
Participants were then asked to complete a second questionnaire. The questionnaire
featured questions about food consumption and food preferences of the participant
and their youngest child as well as the participant’s food consumption during preg-
nancy. The questionnaire furthermore included questions about the stressfulness of
the stress/control task, chronic stress, participants’ coping behaviours when dealing
with stress and about potentially stressful events during the last 3 months as well
as during the pregnancy. The data collected in this questionnaire is used in Belot
et al. (2018) to examine the link between chronic maternal stress during pregnancy
and children’s food preferences.
At the end of the experimental session, a final saliva sample was collected (85 mins
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after the start of the stress / control task). Before receiving their payment, partic-
ipants were told that the snacks provided differed in calorie content (at the request
of the ethics committee).
Table 3.2.2: Experiment Timeline
1- Body measurements & HR watches
2- 1st Saliva Sample (baseline)
3- Stress / Control Task (10 min Task)
4- Food Shopping Choice (10 min Shopping)
5- 2nd Saliva Sample (25 mins after stressor onset)
6- Offered bowls of Low and high calorie snacks
7- 1st Questionnaire (demographics, time & risk prefer-
ences)
8- Collection of bowls of Low and high calorie snacks
9- 2nd Questionnaire (food preferences and consumption,
stressfulness of the task and experience of stressors, cop-
ing abilities, emotional eating)a
10- 3rd Saliva Sample (75 mins after stressor onset)
a The questionnaire featured several questions to examine the link between
chronic maternal stress during pregnancy and children’s food preferences.
3.2.4 Treatments
One concern with previous studies that have found an effect of stress on dietary
choices is their use of artificial stressors (for example, the Trier Social Stress Test by
Kirschbaum et al. [18], or arithmetic exercises). This makes it difficult to extrapolate
from those to real life situations low SES individuals may face.
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We introduce a novel protocol aimed at inducing in mothers the stress they are of-
ten exposed to in real life, and analyse the impact of this type of stress on their
behaviours. We ask mothers to solve a series of time and money budgeting task,
choosing the cheapest or the most time efficient option amongst all, as often required
in real life. We induce stress by introducing monetary penalisation for incorrect or
incomplete tasks. To increase stress, we introduce distracting pop-ups questions,
unrelated to the main task. Finally, we induce stress through time pressure and
through social pressure, by using a group-based incentive scheme. A detailed de-
scription of the treatments follows below.
In the stress treatment, participants were asked to complete a 10-minute block
of short incentivised decision tasks. While the tasks were completed individually, in-
centives were based on the joint performance of “social groups”, to elicit social stress.
Each group consisted of two participants in the same session, which were randomly
matched and anonymous, for ethical motives. Incorrect answers and incomplete tasks
were penalized. Time pressure was induced by the tight overall time limit as well as
by time penalties and time limits per task. Short incentivised knowledge questions
appeared on screen throughout the course of the task block at pre-specified times
unknown to participants, to induce additional stress through distractions. As men-
tioned above, this stress protocol was designed to mimic stressors often experienced
by low-socioeconomic mothers: making decisions with consequences for others (e.g.
for the family) subject to financial and time constraints as well as distractions (e.g.
by children requiring attention).
After an initial instruction period, participants were asked to complete a block of
15 short decision tasks on the lab computers. Sample screenshots of the stress tasks
are shown in Figures 3.6.4 and 3.6.7 of Appendix 3.6.3. They were given 10 minutes
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to complete as many tasks as they could. This overall time constraint was expected
to be binding for a majority of the participants and hence to induce time pressure.
64.5% of participants in the stress group did not complete all 15 tasks. Participants
also faced individual time limits of 120 seconds for each of the 15 tasks. A countdown
timer at the top of the screen indicated how much time they had left for the current
task. The timer turned red after 70 seconds to indicate that time was running out
and that an initial pay-off deduction (after 75 seconds, details below) was imminent.
If participants had not submitted an answer after 120 seconds, their current answer
was submitted automatically and the next task appeared.
The decision tasks comprised budget tasks and time management tasks. For the bud-
get tasks, participants were asked to choose the cheapest way to purchase a given
basket of household expenditure items from a list of options. For example, partic-
ipants were asked to purchase five t-shirts choosing from a list of t-shirts, which
included single items as well as value packs consisting of multiple items. For the
time management task, participants were given a list of diary items and were asked
to schedule these in a timetable provided. The items to be scheduled were of dif-
ferent lengths and a variety of constraints needed to be considered when scheduling
them: some items needed to be scheduled at a specific time or within some given
time window. These types of decision tasks were chosen to reflect prominent aspects
of decisions faced by low-income mothers: limited financial and time resources.
To induce additional stress through distractions, 10 simple knowledge questions ap-
peared as pop-ups on screen throughout the block of tasks. The pop-ups were pro-
grammed to appear at predetermined times within the 10 minutes, no matter what
task was currently shown and how much time had elapsed on this task5. When a
pop-up was open, participants could not see or continue their work on the current
5Pop-ups were programmed to appear 20, 70, 130, 180, 230, 280, 360, 440, 490 and 540 seconds
after the beginning of the 10 minute block of tasks.
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task until they submitted an answer; however, the countdown timer for the current
task was visible and continued to run down. The knowledge questions in the pop-ups
were chosen such that a majority of participants would know the answer (e.g. “What
is the capital of the UK?”). Stress was not to be induced by the difficulty of the
questions, but by the interruption of the current task and the added time pressure.
Participants in the stress treatment were randomly assigned to “social groups” of
two. While participants needed to complete the tasks individually, they were incen-
tivised jointly. Each group was initially allocated £30, the maximum joint incentive
they could earn in the stress task block. The performance of each group member
in the decision tasks and the pop-up knowledge questions determined how much of
the initial £30 was “lost” by the group. This joint incentive structure was chosen
to induce social stress as participants feel that their choices have consequences for
others. We chose to frame the incentives in terms of “losses” rather than “gains”
to avoid inducing positive emotions. Each participant could lose a maximum of £15
to the group, £13.50 from the decision tasks and £1.50 from the pop-up knowledge
questions. In each of the 15 decision tasks, a participant could lose up to £0.90 to
the group. There was no loss if the correct answer was submitted within 75 seconds
of starting a decision task. If a correct answer was given more than 75 seconds after
starting a task, £0.30 was lost. If a wrong answer was given or a task was not at-
tempted or completed, £0.90 was lost. Each of the 10 pop-up knowledge questions
was worth £0.15. If a participant gave a correct answer, there was no deduction. If a
participant gave a wrong answer, £0.15 was lost to the group. This incentive struc-
ture ensured that participants’ performance in every single task and pop-up question
would affect the group’s pay-off. This reduced the risk of participants giving up due
to difficulties in solving some of the tasks. Participants were made aware of the
joint incentive structure and that they are part of a group with another participant
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in the same session. However, the group assignments were not announced to the
participants.
Instead of undergoing the stress treatment procedure, participants in the control
group were asked to complete a task which was comparable in length and of a similar
nature, but which was not aimed at inducing stress. Specifically, they were asked to
answer 14 simple knowledge questions after reading seven short texts about a variety
of topics. A sample screenshot of a control task is shown in Figure B.6 of Appendix B.
The correct answers to each question could be found in the corresponding text. The
questions were similar to those asked via pop-ups during the stress task. Each text
and the corresponding two questions were on a single page, allowing the participants
to easily move back and forth between questions and texts. Participants were given 10
minutes for this task, there were no consequences from not completing all questions.
The task was not incentivised and no “social groups” were formed.
Participants in the treatment group (conditions 1 and 2) received a compensation
between £60 and £75 depending on their incentive group’s performance in the stress
task, the mean compensation received was £67.86. Participants in the control group
(conditions 3 and 4) received a compensation of £60. 16 of the 227 participants
additionally received the food basket they selected during the food shopping task,
worth up to £30.
3.2.5 Food Shopping task
In the food shopping choice, participants were given 10 minutes to allocate a fixed
budget of £30 to food and drink items offered in a “virtual supermarket”, a computer-
based tool similar to online supermarkets. Sample screenshots of the food shopping
task are shown in Figures 3.6.9 to 3.6.11 of Appendix 3.6.3. This “virtual supermar-
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ket” tool used to record participants’ choices was adapted from a tool by Spiteri et al.
[27]. A variety of low-calorie and high-calorie food and drink items was available to
choose from with prices matching market prices at a local supermarket. Participants
were encouraged to make their shopping choices as they would during a weekly shop
at their local supermarket.
The supermarket choice was incentivised: 1 out of 15 participants were randomly
chosen to receive their chosen basket delivered to their home approximately two
weeks after the experimental session. This incentive scheme was chosen to motivate
participants to make choices representative of normal shopping behaviour and the
2-week delay in delivery was chosen to ensure that current stocks (of fresh produce
in particular) would not affect their choices. Participants were informed that, if
they were selected and had not spent the entire £30 budget, they would be paid the
difference in cash up to £2 maximum. This was to discourage non-representative
shopping choices aimed at spending exactly £30, and to ensure that participants did
not feel any pressure to spend the exact amount, which could induce stress for all
participants. Under this incentive scheme, it was optimal for participants to aim to
spend between £28 and £30.
To examine whether choice complexity leads to less healthy decisions under stress,
sessions were pre-assigned to one of two supermarket choice environments (indepen-
dently of the stress treatment assignment): a simple or a complex choice environment.
In both choice environments, 156 grocery items from the following 10 different prod-
uct categories were on offer: fruit, vegetables, egg and dairy, meat and fish, bread
and savoury snacks, pasta and rice, pantry, sweets, ready meals, drinks.
In the simple choice environment, items were displayed on 10 different pages, one for
each product category. In the complex choice environment, items were displayed on
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a single page, grouped by category but without labelling of categories. The order in
which items were displayed within each category was randomized at the participant
level to avoid order effects. Furthermore, the display order of categories and the first
category shown when opening the supermarket tool was randomized.
3.3 Data
We have collected measures relating to the experience of the experimental treatments
and the dietary decisions made by participants in the lab, as well as a range of
control variables. In the following, we describe the measures used to test our research
question.
3.3.1 Food Choice
Immediate food consumption is captured by the snack choice faced by participants.
For a duration of 20 minutes, participants were permitted to consume the snacks
provided on their desks: high-calorie blueberry mini-muffins and low-calorie apple
slices. Snacks were weighed before and after the experiment, the consumption quan-
tities of each snack type (in grams) are the primary outcomes relating to the snack
choice. Secondary outcomes are the total calorie (in kcal), saturated fat (in grams)
and sugar content (in grams) of the consumed snacks; these measures are determin-
istic functions of the two primary outcome variables.
Planned food purchase is captured by the food shopping choice made using the
“virtual supermarket” tool. The nutritional content of the baskets selected by par-
ticipants is calculated. Primary outcomes are the energy (in kcal), the saturated
fat (in grams) and the sugar content (in grams) of the chosen basket. The total
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weight of fruit and vegetables (in grams) chosen by the participant is considered as
a secondary outcome.
3.3.2 Measures of Stress
During the final questionnaire of the experiment, participants were asked about their
perceptions of the stress or control task. Specifically they were asked whether they
perceived the task as relaxing, easy, stressful, difficult, enjoyable and tiring. Each
perception is rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 5 (“very much”).
Of particular interest is the perceived stressfulness of the tasks.
We collected two physiological measures of response to stress: heart rate and
salivary cortisol. The heart rate captures the response of the autonomic nervous
system (ANS) to stress. Cortisol on the other hand captures the response of the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis.
Participants were asked to wear an armband with an optical heart rate sensor (Polar
OH1) during the course of the lab experiment. Heart rate data was recorded in
one-second intervals and stored on the internal memory of the sensor. Due to tech-
nical problems with the sensors, heart rate data is not available for 29 participants.
The resulting heart rate profiles were matched with the precise start times of the
experiment and the stress or control task. To capture the heart rate response to the
stress or control task, we defined a baseline period of 5 minutes, beginning with the
start of the experiment, and a task period of 10 minutes, beginning with the start
of the stress or control task. Comparison of the means during the baseline and the
task period provides a measure of the heart rate response to the tasks.
Participants were asked to provide three saliva samples during the course of the
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experimental session. The baseline sample was collected at the beginning of the
experiment, 9 minutes prior to the start of the stress or control task. The second
sample was collected 29 minutes after the start of the stress / control task and the
final sample was collected 85 minutes after the start of the start / control task.
Cortisol reactivity to a stressor is found to peak between 10 and 40 min following
the start of the stress protocol [23] and should revert back to a normal level when
the final sample is collected.
The samples were collected using synthetic swabs (Sarstedt Salivette Cortisol), which
were chewed by participants for 60 seconds and then placed in storage tubes. Samples
were frozen immediately after collection. After completion of the experiment, the
samples were shipped under dry ice to Daacro Saliva Lab in Trier (Germany) for
analysis. Samples were analysed in duplicate for salivary cortisol and testosterone
content. Comparison of salivary cortisol of the baseline and the second saliva sample
provides a measure of the cortisol response to the tasks.
3.3.3 Stress task performance
Participants in the stress group were asked to complete a 10 minute block of incen-
tivised tasks. Each participant could lose between £0 and £15 to their randomly
assigned group. Rescaling this measure to run from 0% (no correct answers given)
to 100% (all tasks and pop-ups solved correctly) allows us to capture participants’




A. If hormonal responses to stress induce a change in preference for energy dense
foods, we expect acute stress to increased selection of foods high in calories,
sugar and saturated fats. The increase would be stronger in immediate con-
sumption (“snack choice”), driven more prominently by immediate preferences.
B. If stress drains mental resources and worsens the ability to make reasoned
decisions, the impact of acute stress will be stronger on planned consump-
tion (“food shopping choice”), especially among participants assigned to the
complex choice environment. Here, participants will select more foods high in
calories, sugar and saturated fats.
C. The impact of acute stress on both types of food consumption choices will be
stronger among participants who cope less well with stress.
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Demographic characteristics of our sample are in Table 3.4.1. The average age of
mothers is approximately 36 years and on average, they have two children. 28% of
mothers raise their youngest child by themselves. 61% of mothers are married or
in a cohabiting relationship. 43% of participants completed GCSEs as their highest
qualification, for 38% A levels are the highest qualification. 10% of mothers work
full-time, 59% are in part-time employment and 24% are not employed. The only
statistically significant difference between the stress and the control group is the age
of the youngest child.
Descriptive statistics of the dietary measures used in our analysis are displayed in
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Table 3.4.2. On average, participants ate 41g (171 kcal) of the blueberry mini-muffins
and 74g (41 kcal) of the apple slices offered during the snack choice. The average
shopping basket selected during the food-shopping choice contained approximately
17000 kcal, 460g of fat, 200g of saturated fat and 750g of sugar.
3.4.3 Empirical Strategy
We analyse the impact of acute stress and choice complexity on dietary choices. We
first estimate the linear models for the impact of the stress treatment on dietary
choices measured with the outcomes described above. We then estimate the rele-
vance of choice complexity on the outcomes related to the food shopping choice. To
do so, we include an indicator for being assigned to the stress treatment and also
an indicator for assignment to the complex choice environment and the interaction
between the two. To capture any potentially confounding factors we include a vector
of control variables. The controls are dummy variables for the time of the experi-
mental session, for the consumption of any food in the last hour, any drink in the
last hour, any cocoa product in the last 6 hours and any big meal in the last 6 hours.
These control variables were chosen as they differed significantly between the treat-
ment and the control group. We estimate all models using the ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimator. To account for potential error correlation among individuals in
the same experimental session, we estimate standard errors robust to clustering at
the session level. Due to the relatively small number of clusters, the wild cluster
bootstrap approach proposed by Cameron et al. [7] is used to estimate the clustered
standard errors.
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Table 3.4.1: Demographic characteristics
(1) (2) (1) vs (2)
Stress Control P-Value
Age - mother 35.7 36.24 0.53
-5.96 -5.83
Age - youngest child 5.94 7.1 0.01
-2.79 -3.09
No. of children 1.97 2.18 0.15
-1.01 -1.01
Single parent 0.28 0.28 0.99
-0.45 -0.45
Marital status:
single 0.21 0.26 0.48
married 0.44 0.39 0.52
cohabiting 0.17 0.21 0.42
other 0.18 0.13 0.42
Monthly HH net income:
<1000 GBP 0.13 0.09 0.37
1000-2000 GBP 0.46 0.49 0.61
>2000 GBP 0.41 0.42 0.95
Monthly benefits:
none 0.17 0.11 0.26
1-650 GBP 0.56 0.65 0.23
>650 GBP 0.27 0.24 0.66
Highest qualification:
none 0.08 0.1 0.68
low GCSE 0.17 0.1 0.18
high GCSE 0.26 0.33 0.33
A levels 0.38 0.37 0.86
professional 0.1 0.1 0.97
Employment status:
full-time 0.11 0.08 0.43
part-time 0.54 0.64 0.17
self-employed 0.08 0.06 0.45
not employed 0.26 0.22 0.55
N 107 89 196
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Table 3.4.2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max
Snack choice:
Muffins (g) 41.15 34.8 0 142
Apples (g) 74.46 48.82 0 180
Energy (kcal) 211.64 151.95 0 667.19
Fat (g) 9.13 7.67 0 31.38
Saturated fat (g) 1.15 0.97 0 3.98
Carbohydrates (g) 29.73 19.49 0 89.31
Sugar (g) 20.68 12.41 0 58.51
Protein (g) 1.99 1.53 0 6.51
Salt (g) 0.2 0.15 0 0.65
Shopping choice:
Energy (kcal) 16960.1 4046.76 7094.9 27061.19
Fat (g) 463.14 197.5 113.29 1167.79
Saturated fat (g) 199.43 95.32 31.32 555.6
Carbohydrates (g) 2304.84 827.72 106.24 4619.4
Sugar (g) 748.31 245.26 87 1675.11
Protein (g) 771.13 169.59 401.07 1199.4
Salt (g) 34.04 9.63 5.23 61.6
Fruit & veg (g) 2838.55 1820.31 0 9164
N 196
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3.4.4 Pre-test of the Experimental Design
The experimental design was pre-tested in June 2018 using a sample of 50 low-income
mothers in Florence, Italy. Results from this pre-test using an eligible sample of 41
participants showed the novel stress protocol to be effective.
The stress task was perceived as significantly more stressful than the control task.
The mean heart rate of participants in the stress group increased significantly by 7.0
bpm (8.5%) between baseline and the stress task, a difference-in-difference compar-
ison relative to the control group showed a statistically significant increase by 10.0
bpm. A difference-in-difference comparison showed the stress protocol to induce a
statistically significant and sizeable increase in salivary cortisol levels. Comparison of
salivary cortisol levels before and after completion of the stress/control task showed
an increase by 1.1 nmol/L (24.0%) in the stress group and a decrease by 1.1 nmol/L
(22.2%) in the control group.
No significant impacts of acute stress on food choices were observed in the pre-test.
The consumed quantities in the snack choice and the nutritional content of baskets
chosen in the food shopping choice were not found to differ significantly between
stress and control group.
3.4.5 Effectiveness of Stress Protocol
Our study relies on the effectiveness of our novel stress protocol in inducing acute
stress. We check this effectiveness by examining the participants’ perceptions of the
stress and control tasks as well as the response of heart rate and salivary cortisol to
the tasks. Table 3.4.3 shows participants’ mean perceptions of the stress and control
tasks. The stress task was perceived as significantly more stressful. With a mean
perceived stressfulness of 2.7 on the 5-point Likert scale from 1 (“not at all”) to 5
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(“very much”), the stress task is perceived as mildly stressful. This is a considerable
difference to the mean perceived stressfulness of 1.5 for the control task. The stress
task was furthermore perceived as significantly less relaxing, less easy, more difficult,
less enjoyable and more tiring.
Table 3.4.3: Mean perceptions of stress / control task
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Stressful Relaxing Easy Difficult Enjoyable Tiring N
Treatment 2.745 2.642 3.151 2.5 3.377 2 106
-0.064 -0.096 -0.107 -0.078 -0.044 -0.089
Control 1.517 3.382 4.607 1.258 3.652 1.596 89
-0.094 -0.106 -0.047 -0.062 -0.056 -0.105
Difference 1.228 -0.741 -1.456 1.242 -0.274 0.404
P 0 0 0 0 0.002 0.011
P(Wild) 0 0 0 0 0.005 0.02
Notes: Perceptions of the stress / control task were scored from 1 for ’not at all’ to 5 for ’very
much’. Standard errors of the mean were clustered at the session level and are shown in
parentheses. For the difference in mean between treatment and control, p-values based on
standard errors clustered at the session level and p-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered
at the session level are shown.
We now turn to the two measures of physiological response to the task. The first
is heart rate, the second is cortisol. Participants wore a heart rate monitor during
the course of the experiment to track the physiological response of the autonomic
nervous system to the stress and control tasks. Figure 3.4.1 shows the mean heart
rate of participants in stress and control group for minute intervals during the base-
line (the first 5 minutes of the experiment), the pre-task phase, the task and the
post-task phase. There are no significant differences in the heart rate levels during
baseline between the stress and control group. The pre-task period shows slightly
higher heart rate levels in the stress than in the control group, this is likely due to
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anticipation effects as participants are instructed about the tasks during this phase.
Significant differences in heart rate appear immediately after the start of the stress
and control task. During the first minute of the task, the mean heart rate of par-
ticipants completing the stress task is 3.8 bpm (4.8%) above the heart rate of those
completing the control task. The second minute of the task shows an even larger
difference of 6.1 bpm (7.8%). In the remainder of the task stage the difference in
mean heart rate reduces somewhat. However, the mean heart rate remains signifi-
cantly higher in the stress group, with the exception of the last minute of the task
when the difference is only marginally significant. The gap in heart rate between the
two groups closes within minutes of completing the task, no significant differences
are found during the post-task period.
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Figure 3.4.1: Heart rate response to stress / control task
Means were calculated for minute intervals based on heart rate data collected every second. Bands
indicate +/- standard error. The length of the pre-task period differed across sessions (between 9
min 45 s and 13 min 39 s), but it did not differ significantly between stress and control session.
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Difference-in-difference comparison of heart rate means across the two groups
and between the baseline and task stages are shown in Table 3.4.4. For the control
group, mean heart rate is reduced by 3.7 bpm (4.6%) between baseline and the task
stage. This downward trend in heart rate is likely due to an elevated heart-rate from
physiological activity (e.g. the walk from the car park to the laboratory) wearing off
over time as participants remained seated during this part of the experiment.
For the stress group, we observe no significant change in mean heart rate from the
baseline to the task stage. The downward trend observed in the control group is
cancelled out in the stress group by the increase in heart rate caused by the acute
stressor. The difference-in-difference comparison shows a significantly increased heart
rate during the stress task by 3.8 bpm relative to the control group. In other relevant
studies reported in Appendix 3.6.1, Table 3.6.1, no significant difference in heart rate
in found when using stressors related to mathematical skills or similar to the Trier
test.
Table 3.4.4: Heart rate response to stress / control task
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
Baseline Task Diff P P(Wild) N
Treatment 80.854 80.917 0.062 0.916 0.902 94
(0.638) (0.927)
Control 80.807 77.104 -3.703 0.000 0.020 73
-1.840 -1.307
Diff-in-Diff 3.766 0.001 0.000 167
Notes: Means were calculated based on heart rate data collected every second. Standard
errors were clustered at the session level and are shown in parentheses. For the difference
between task and baseline, p-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level and
p-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown.
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Over the course of the experiment, we collected three saliva samples from each
participant to track the physiological response of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
(HPA) axis to the stress and control tasks. A baseline sample was collected prior
to completion of the stress or control task, a second sample 29 minutes after the
start of the task and a final sample at the end of the experimental session. Figure
3.4.2 shows the mean salivary cortisol concentrations of participants in the stress
and control groups across these three measurements. Other experiments, using the
Trier Social stress Test or mathematical tasks, have shown an increase in cortisol
level after the stressor and a subsequent decrease in the post-experimental period.
For both groups, we observe a downward trend in salivary cortisol over the course of
the experiment. With the exception of a marginally significant difference in baseline
cortisol, we do not observe any differences in salivary cortisol between the stress and
control group.
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Figure 3.4.2: Salivary cortisol response to stress / control task
Bands indicate +/- standard error.
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Difference-in-difference comparison of mean cortisol concentrations across the
two groups are shown in Table 3.4.5. A comparison of the cortisol change from the
baseline to the second measurement shows a marginally significant difference, with
cortisol concentrations decreasing less in the stress group. As this result is entirely
driven by differences in the baseline cortisol levels, it cannot be used as indication
of a cortisol response to the acute stressor.
Our findings show that the stress protocol was perceived as mildly stressful. An
Table 3.4.5: Salivary cortisol response to stress / control task
(1) (2) (3) (2)-(1)
Baseline Post-Task End Diff P P(Wild) N
Treatment 4.262 3.500 3.095 -0.761 0.001 0.008 107
(0.322) (0.240) (0.282)
Control 4.892 3.556 3.025 -1.335 0.000 0.009 89
(0.384) (0.241) (0.336)
Diff-in-Diff 0.574 0.089 0.094 196
Notes: Standard errors were clustered at the session level and are shown in parentheses. For
the difference between post-task and baseline, p-values based on standard errors clustered at
the session level and p-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are
shown.
increased heart rate during the stress task indicates a physiological response of the
autonomic nervous system to this stressor. We do not observe a response of the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis to our stress protocol. However, the
lack of a cortisol response should not be seen as indication of a failure to induce
stress, as cortisol measurement are very sensitive to the timing of the measurements
(relative to the stressor) and to a variety of unobservable factors. Also, we do not
find any correlation between the stress level measured in the lab and the chronic
stress during the last 3 months, measured with the questionnaire.
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3.4.6 Impact of Acute Stress on Food Choices
In the following, we examine the impact of acute stress by comparing the food choices
made during the experiment by participants assigned to the stress and control group
(Hypothesis A). We consider food choices in the context of immediate and planned
consumption.
Table 3.4.6 shows OLS results for the impact of acute stress on immediate food
consumption as captured by the snack choice during the experiment. Columns (1)
and (3) correspond to bivariate models. In columns (2) and (4) we control for the
time of the experimental session and for the consumption of foods and drinks prior
to the experiment. As shown in column 1, participants in the control group ate 38.2g
of the high-calorie mini-muffins. Participants in the treatment group consumed an
additional 5.4g of the muffins. While this difference is not negligible in size, it is
not statistically significant. When controlling for potentially confounding factors
that differed between stress and control groups in column 2, we observe a similar
difference in muffin intake of 5.1g, which again is not statistically significant.
As reported in column 3, subject in the control condition ate 72.8g of the low-calorie
apple slices while participants in the treatment condition ate an additional 3.1g. This
difference in apple intake increases to 5.7g when controlling for session time and for
the prior consumption of foods and drinks in column 4. In both specifications, the
difference in apple consumption between stress and control group is not precisely
estimated. While we observe acute stress to increase intake of both high- and low-
calorie snacks, these increases are not statistically significant.
When examining the total energy, saturated fat and sugar intake from both snack
types (see Table 3.6.3 of Appendix 3.6.4), we again find no statistically significant
differences between stress and control group.
We now turn to examining the impact of acute stress on planned future food
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Table 3.4.6: Impact of acute stress on snack consumption
Muffins (g) Apples (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 5.396 5.081 3.053 5.736
(0.433) (0.394) (0.627) (0.406)
[0.454] [0.443] [0.644] [0.476]
Constant 38.202*** 48.178*** 72.798*** 78.699***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
consumption, by analysing the nutrient content of the baskets selected during the
food shopping choice by participants in the stress and control group. OLS results
for the impact of the stress protocol on total energy, saturated fat and sugar content
of the selected grocery items can be found in Table 3.4.7. Participants in the control
group selected baskets with a mean energy content of 17,138 kcal, 202g of saturated
fat and 775g of sugar. Results for the bivariate models in columns 1, 3 and 5 show
participants in the stress group on average selected baskets containing 327 kcal less
energy, 5g less saturated fat and 48g less sugar. When controlling for the timing of the
experimental sessions and the intake of food and drink prior to arrival, the differences
in energy and saturated fat content are substantially reduced, to 103 kcal and 2g
respectively. The difference in sugar content, on the other hand, increases slightly
to 53g. The differences in nutrient content of baskets selected by the stress and
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control groups are not statistically significant in any of the specifications. In further
estimations (see Table 3.6.4 of Appendix 3.6.4), we find no significant difference in
the weight of fruit and vegetables purchased by the stress and control groups. These
findings do not support the hypothesis that acute stress leads to less healthy food
choices in the context of planned consumption. Summarizing, these results suggest
no significant relationship between mild stress and either immediate or planned food
consumption.
Table 3.4.7: Impact of acute stress on food shopping
Energy (kcal) Saturated fat (g) Sugar (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -326.627 -103.019 -5.403 -2.101 -48.356 -52.720
(0.482) (0.820) (0.594) (0.860) (0.269) (0.257)
[0.503] [0.838] [0.585] [0.861] [0.295] [0.302]
Constant 17138.414*** 17068.346*** 202.380*** 199.379*** 774.705*** 783.333***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
3.4.7 Role of choice complexity
We now examine whether the complexity of the food shopping choice affects the
healthiness of the chosen grocery items, in particular under acute stress (Hypothesis
B). OLS results for the impact of the stress protocol and the choice complexity (both
randomly pre-assigned) on the nutrient content of the chosen food-shopping basket
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are reported in Table 3.4.8. Results in columns 1 and 2 show a lower energy content
of baskets selected in the complex choice environment, both among the stress and the
control group. As shown in columns 3 and 4, we observe the saturated fat content
of baskets selected in the complex choice environment to be lower in the control, but
higher in the stress group. Columns 5 and 6 show the sugar content of baskets chosen
in the complex choice environment to be higher in the control, but lower in the stress
group. The impact of choice complexity on the above outcomes is not statistically
significant. Thus, the evidence does not suggest stress to have differential effects on
dietary choices depending on the complexity of the choices.
Table 3.4.8: Impact of acute stress and choice complexity on food shopping
Energy (kcal) Saturated fat (g) Sugar (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -222.230 -20.000 -7.775 -4.740 -18.233 -22.833
(0.755) (0.974) (0.524) (0.736) (0.754) (0.701)
[0.793] [0.980] [0.603] [0.785] [0.804] [0.770]
Complex -340.412 -214.320 -10.009 -11.634 42.809 42.745
(0.618) (0.749) (0.505) (0.427) (0.399) (0.415)
[0.668] [0.791] [0.615] [0.613] [0.464] [0.505]
Treatment * Complex -221.648 -201.619 5.366 5.072 -66.574 -63.893
(0.792) (0.802) (0.794) (0.814) (0.431) (0.515)
[0.807] [0.826] [0.803] [0.856] [0.470] [0.673]
Constant 17291.408*** 17126.435*** 206.878*** 204.421*** 755.465*** 759.469***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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3.4.8 Role of coping style and stress response
In additional estimations, we examine whether certain coping styles or a strong
physiological or psychological response to the experimental stressor affect the sus-
ceptibility of participants’ dietary choices to the acute stress protocol (Hypothesis
C). The self-assessed use of avoidance-based, emotion-oriented and task-oriented cop-
ing styles are not found to significantly alter the dietary choices made by the stress
group (see Tables 3.4.9 and 3.4.10). Despite some significant coefficient estimates,
we find no strong evidence that perceiving the task as stressful makes participants’
food choices more susceptible to the stressor (see Tables 3.6.5 and 3.6.6 of Appendix
3.6.4). The physiological responses to the stressor as captured by the heart rate
and salivary cortisol response do not predict stronger susceptibility of participant’s
choices to the stress protocol (see Tables 3.6.7 to 3.6.10 of Appendix 3.6.4).
3.4.9 Role of emotional eating, time preferences and risk
attitudes
We do not find evidence that the self-assessed tendency to eat when emotional, as
captured by the emotional eating dimension of the Dutch Eating Behaviour Ques-
tionnaire [30], affects the dietary response to stress (see Tables 3.6.11 and 3.6.12 of
Appendix 3.6.4). Self-assessed time preferences, both generally and in the context of
health, are not found to alter the susceptibility of participants’ dietary choices to the
experimental stressor (see Tables 3.6.13 and 3.6.14 of Appendix 3.6.4). Self-assessed
general risk aversion is found to significantly decrease muffin intake in the snack
choice, however only in the control group (see Table 3.6.15 of Appendix 3.6.4). In
the food shopping choice, general risk aversion is found to decrease energy content
of baskets selected by participants in the stress group, this association is marginally
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Table 3.4.9: Impact of acute stress and coping style on snack consumption
Muffins (g) Apples (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 1.964 5.192 44.084 55.531
(0.961) (0.899) (0.304) (0.197)
[0.968] [0.919] [0.307] [0.205]
Coping: avoidance -1.034 0.086 10.160* 11.224*
(0.686) (0.971) (0.041) (0.019)
[0.672] [0.978] [0.094] [0.078]
Coping: emotion 2.983 2.581 3.828 3.847
(0.388) (0.448) (0.402) (0.378)
[0.422] [0.492] [0.439] [0.388]
Coping: task -4.961 -5.321 3.512 2.968
(0.378) (0.388) (0.457) (0.517)
[0.447] [0.420] [0.463] [0.546]
Treatment * Avoidance 1.975 0.831 -10.935 -11.992
(0.691) (0.877) (0.212) (0.183)
[0.741] [0.910] [0.215] [0.186]
Treatment * Emotion -3.785 -2.020 -5.885 -5.467
(0.354) (0.666) (0.373) (0.390)
[0.376] [0.666] [0.397] [0.409]
Treatment * Task 2.203 0.781 2.654 0.725
(0.727) (0.909) (0.693) (0.924)
[0.733] [0.913] [0.717] [0.930]
Constant 52.018 61.636* 16.832 22.009
(0.135) (0.083) (0.548) (0.371)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.4.10: Impact of acute stress and coping style on food shopping
Energy (kcal) Saturated fat (g) Sugar (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 1490.410 1676.567 0.452 23.098 249.014 232.883
(0.652) (0.631) (0.995) (0.735) (0.225) (0.263)
[0.644] [0.615] [0.997] [0.743] [0.251] [0.310]
Coping: avoidance -101.176 -123.614 4.890 4.042 -18.582 -17.944
(0.849) (0.828) (0.549) (0.655) (0.512) (0.525)
[0.854] [0.837] [0.568] [0.665] [0.582] [0.573]
Coping: emotion -307.176 -352.800 -14.458 -14.280 9.768 9.415
(0.590) (0.544) (0.088) (0.076) (0.651) (0.657)
[0.593] [0.557] [0.199] [0.130] [0.832] [0.855]
Coping: task 364.684 366.391 5.651 7.662 58.496 57.868
(0.524) (0.529) (0.433) (0.282) (0.149) (0.164)
[0.519] [0.521] [0.425] [0.305] [0.223] [0.227]
Treatment * Avoidance -478.921 -411.252 -10.300 -8.326 2.923 1.634
(0.462) (0.551) (0.279) (0.401) (0.925) (0.959)
[0.462] [0.592] [0.244] [0.398] [0.920] [0.972]
Treatment * Emotion 61.582 124.442 13.533 12.592 -11.708 -9.660
(0.929) (0.860) (0.311) (0.369) (0.726) (0.760)
[0.921] [0.866] [0.313] [0.366] [0.741] [0.747]
Treatment * Task -120.450 -216.977 -4.020 -9.630 -67.354 -65.017
(0.890) (0.810) (0.812) (0.550) (0.138) (0.180)
[0.887] [0.814] [0.812] [0.536] [0.182] [0.215]
Constant 16917.933*** 17021.025*** 209.556*** 201.177*** 565.223** 574.240***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.008)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in parentheses. P-values
based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in brackets. Significance levels correspond to
the largest p-value obtained from both methods and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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significant (see Table 3.6.16 of Appendix 3.6.4).Altogether, the evidence we collected
provides no empirical support to the hypothesis that acute stress leads to unhealthier
dietary choices.
3.5 Impact of failure
In additional estimations, we examine the impact of task performance on dietary
choices (see Tables 3.5.1 and 3.5.2). Table 3.5.1 shows OLS results for the impact of
acute stress on immediate food consumption, controlling for the performance in the
stress task. Task performance can range from 0 to 100, where 100 corresponds to
solving all 15 tasks and 10 pop-up questions correctly and without a time penalty.
We estimate an extremely poor performance in the stress task to increase muffin
intake by 30.8g compared to the control group, which corresponds to an intake of
127.8 additional kcal, as shown in column 1. This difference is not only big in mag-
nitude, but also statistically significant. An improvement in task performance by 1
standard deviation, reduces muffin intake by 10.3g (a 0.29 std reduction in muffin
intake). Controlling for potentially confounding factors in column 2 leads to similar
results. There is no significant effect on the intake of apple slices.
Table 3.5.2 reports the impact of acute stress on planned future food consumption,
controlling for stress task performance. We estimate an extremely poor performance
in the stress task to decrease the energy content of the selected basket by 2152 kcal,
the saturated fat content by 35g and the sugar content by 68g. Performing well in
the task increases energy, saturated fat and sugar content of the selected basket.
Also when controlling for the timing of the experimental sessions and the intake of
food and drink prior to arrival, the magnitude of these estimates are similar. The
differences in nutrient content of baskets selected by the stress and control groups
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and the effect of stress task performance are though however not statistically signif-
icant in any of the specifications.
While performance in the task was not experimentally assigned and hence these re-
sults cannot be interpreted as causal, we find a substantial and statistically significant
correlation of a lower performance in the stress task and an increased consumption
of high-calorie snacks. Participants who fail the task consume almost double the
amount of calories than participants in the control group, with this increase reduc-
ing with success in the task. This hints at the role of failure in mediating an impact
of acute stress on the intake of high-calorie foods. This effect seem in line with
the literature, where often solvable versus unsolvable tasks are used to study stress-
induced changes in dietary choices, possibly hinging on failure to find an impact on
food consumption (see Appendix 3.6.1, Table 3.6.1 for a review of the stressors used)
3.6 Conclusion
In this study, we examine the impact of acute stress on food choices, both in the
context of immediate and planned consumption, by evaluating a lab experiment with
196 low-income mothers. We employed a novel incentivised stress protocol developed
to mimic everyday stressors in low-income families. At the start of the experiment,
participants in the treatment group were asked to complete this stress task, while
participants in the control group were asked to complete a control task. Afterwards,
participants were asked to purchase food items in a “virtual supermarket” as part of
an incentivised food shopping choice and were offered high- and low-calorie snacks for
immediate consumption. We use the nutritional content of the chosen food-shopping
basket and the quantity of snacks eaten to determine the impact of acute stress on
planned and immediate food consumption choices. We asked participants about
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Table 3.5.1: Impact of acute stress and task performance on snack consumption
Muffins (g) Apples (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 30.803*** 31.214*** 4.903 5.510
(0.003) (0.001) (0.648) (0.661)
[0.009] [0.000] [0.641] [0.666]
Stress task performance -0.502*** -0.516*** -0.037 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.874) (0.985)
[0.009] [0.007] [0.869] [0.987]
Constant 38.202*** 48.098*** 72.798*** 78.700***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.5.2: Impact of acute stress and task performance on food shopping
Energy (kcal) Saturated fat (g) Sugar (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -2152.804 -1813.934 -34.934 -32.259 -68.013 -70.393
(0.142) (0.216) (0.237) (0.315) (0.332) (0.344)
[0.198] [0.216] [0.290] [0.469] [0.384] [0.372]
Stress task performance 36.098 33.798 0.584 0.596 0.389 0.349
(0.179) (0.225) (0.243) (0.271) (0.745) (0.776)
[0.208] [0.248] [0.401] [0.395] [0.776] [0.721]
Constant 17138.414*** 17073.556*** 202.380*** 199.471*** 774.705*** 783.387***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in parentheses. P-values
based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in brackets. Significance levels correspond to
the largest p-value obtained from both methods and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
their perceptions of the stress or control task and measured their salivary cortisol
as well as their heart rate over the course of the experimental sessions to assess the
stressfulness of the stress task.
The novel stress protocol was perceived by participants as significantly more stressful
than the control task. This is supported by a significant increase in the heart rate of
participants in the stress group when compared to the control group. We, however,
do not observe a significant difference in the cortisol levels of the stress and the
control group. Cortisol responses can be problematic to induce and measure, so this
should not be seen as a failure to induce stress. The task perceptions and heart rate
data are reliable evidence that mild stress was induced among the stress group, but
not among the control group.
We do not find evidence of a significant impact of acute stress on immediate or
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planned food choices. Previous findings in the literature report a positive impact of
acute stress, induced using artificial stressors such as unsolvable mathematical tasks
or the Trier stress test, on food consumption. Contrary to these studies, our stressor
does not produce a change in food choices. The complexity of the choice environment,
participants’ coping styles as well as the psychological and physiological response to
the experimental stressor are not found to affect the susceptibility of dietary choices
to acute stress. If we control for performance in the task though, we find that poor
performance leads to a higher intake of calorie dense foods (muffins).
In future research, we plan to study the impact of experimentally assigned stress
and failure on immediate food consumption and a series of measures related to
depletion of cognitive skills. We also plan to separate the impact of stress and
failure from the one of stress.
Our stress protocol is designed to mimic stressors our sample often faces in real
life. We acknowledge finally, as limitation of research conducted experimentally in
the lab, that stress induced in the lab is not comparable in magnitude to the one
participants might face in their daily lives.
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Appendix
3.6.1 Literature on Stress and Diet
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Figure 3.6.1: Leaflet for recruitment
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Figure 3.6.2: Letter for recruitment
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3.6.3 Experiment Set-Up and Experimental Tasks
Figure 3.6.3: Picture of participant desk prior to experimental session
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Figure 3.6.4: Screenshot of a budget task
Figure 3.6.5: Screenshot of a budget task after the countdown timer turns red
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Figure 3.6.6: Screenshot of a time management task
Figure 3.6.7: Screenshot of a pop-up with a knowledge question
207
Figure 3.6.8: Screenshot of a control task
Figure 3.6.9: Screenshot of food shopping task - categorized version
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Figure 3.6.10: Screenshot of food shopping task - long version
Figure 3.6.11: Screenshot of food shopping task - shopping cart
3.6.4 Additional Results
Table 3.6.2 reports the level of control variables at baseline across different treatment
groups. There is no significant difference at baseline between treatments.
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Table 3.6.2: Balance of control variables across groups
(1) (2) (1) vs (2)
Stress Control P-Value
Session time: 10:30 0.43 0.33 0.14
14:00 0.22 0.42 0.00
17:00 0.35 0.26 0.19
Room temperature 22.90 22.89 0.92
(0.69) (0.47)
Diet - mother: vegetarian 0.07 0.06 0.79
(0.25) (0.23)
vegan 0.00 0.00 .
(0.00) (0.00)
allergies 0.02 0.02 0.85
(0.14) (0.15)
intolerances 0.03 0.00 0.11
(0.17) (0.00)
other 0.05 0.02 0.36
(0.21) (0.15)
Snack position: apples - right 0.44 0.45 0.88
(0.50) (0.50)
Previous experiment 0.21 0.16 0.39
(0.41) (0.37)
Food - last 1hr 0.18 0.06 0.01
(0.38) (0.23)
Big meal - last 6hrs 0.19 0.09 0.05
(0.39) (0.29)
Cocoa - last 6hrs 0.08 0.03 0.14
(0.28) (0.18)
Drink - last 1hr 0.26 0.13 0.03
(0.44) (0.34)
Alcohol - last 24hrs 0.18 0.15 0.55
(0.38) (0.36)
Caffeine - last 6hrs 0.50 0.51 0.89
(0.50) (0.50)
Medication - last 24hrs 0.36 0.34 0.69
(0.48) (0.48)
Exercise - last 6hrs 0.27 0.21 0.35
(0.45) (0.41)
Smoker 0.30 0.28 0.78
(0.46) (0.45)
Cigarettes per day 8.56 8.12 0.73
(4.85) (4.75)
Any allergies 0.38 0.36 0.73
(0.49) (0.48)
Regular medication 0.27 0.33 0.41
(0.45) (0.47)
Oral contraceptive 0.27 0.22 0.46
(0.45) (0.42)
Menopause 0.01 0.00 0.36
(0.10) (0.00)
Endocrine disorders 0.00 0.00 1.00
(0.14) (0.15)
N 107 89 196
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Tables 3.6.3 and 3.6.4 perform the analysis of the impact of acute stress on
secondary outcomes for snack consumption and food shopping. We find no significant
impact on acute stress on the secondary outcomes.
Table 3.6.3: Impact of acute stress on snack consumption - secondary outcomes
Energy (kcal) Saturated fat (g) Sugar (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 24.069 24.236 0.151 0.142 1.886 2.128
(0.439) (0.376) (0.433) (0.394) (0.456) (0.359)
[0.474] [0.427] [0.473] [0.470] [0.502] [0.417]
Constant 198.505*** 243.143*** 1.070*** 1.349*** 19.651*** 23.170***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Tables 3.6.5 and Tables 3.6.6 examine the impact of perceived stressfulness of the
task on snack choice and on food shopping decision. The perceived stressfulness of
the task does not have any significant impact on the outcomes.
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Table 3.6.4: Impact of acute stress on food shopping - secondary outcome








Session time No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes
N 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Tables 3.6.7 -3.6.8 and 3.6.9 -3.6.10 examine the impact of heart rate response
and of salivary cortisol response on snack choice and on food shopping decision. None
of these measures has a significant impact on the outcomes. Tables 3.6.11 and 3.6.12
analyse the impact of emotional eating, measured via the DEBQ questionnaire, on
snack choice and on food shopping decision. Tables 3.6.13 - 3.6.14 and 3.6.15 - 3.6.16
study the impact of time preferences and risk attitudes on snack choice and on food
shopping decision. Here again we do not find a significant impact on the outcomes.
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Table 3.6.5: Impact of acute stress and perceived stressfulness on snack consumption
Muffins (g) Apples (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment -14.025 -12.134 -4.606 1.101
(0.179) (0.207) (0.723) (0.929)
[0.208] [0.231] [0.747] [0.934]
Task perception: stressful -5.188 -4.332 2.012 3.049
(0.196) (0.301) (0.611) (0.440)
[0.274] [0.336] [0.597] [0.419]
Treatment * Stressful 9.463* 8.208 1.628 -0.140
(0.034) (0.066) (0.750) (0.977)
[0.084] [0.101] [0.744] [0.980]
Constant 46.071*** 54.221*** 69.746*** 74.680***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes
N 195 195 195 195
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6.6: Impact of acute stress and perceived stressfulness on food shopping
Energy (kcal) Saturated fat (g) Sugar (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 1.102.994 1.529.846 -24.655 -23.639 75.010 71.793
(0.422) (0.257) (0.218) (0.352) (0.372) (0.373)
[0.466] [0.283] [0.225] [0.339] [0.391] [0.428]
Task perception: stressful 80.999 95.805 0.662 1.178 54.606 55.449
(0.825) (0.825) (0.807) (0.761) (0.132) (0.130)
[0.892] [0.895] [0.805] [0.784] [0.081] [0.117]
Treatment * Stressful -548.764 -609.869 6.157 6.255 -69.615* -70.220*
(0.278) (0.252) (0.373) (0.449) (0.081) (0.073)
[0.326] [0.292] [0.367] [0.418] [0.049] [0.051]
Constant 17015.549*** 16927.178*** 201.375*** 198.578*** 691.876*** 703.664***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 195 195 195 195 195 195
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6.7: Impact of acute stress and heart rate response on snack consumption
Muffins (g) Apples (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 3.936 4.764 -4.402 -1.175
(0.586) (0.430) (0.622) (0.896)
[0.623] [0.495] [0.647] [0.897]
HR response 0.586 0.543 2.235 1.954*
(0.237) (0.127) (0.062) (0.077)
[0.295] [0.139] [0.105] [0.050]
Treatment * HR response -2.108** -1.952** -3.293 -2.877
(0.020) (0.021) (0.093) (0.128)
[0.035] [0.021] [0.122] [0.150]
Constant 38.351*** 45.225*** 82.334*** 86.993***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes
N 167 167 167 167
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6.8: Impact of acute stress and heart rate response on food shopping
Energy (kcal) Saturated fat (g) Sugar (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -514.505 -221.535 9.456 12.999 -117.593 -123.976
(0.312) (0.717) (0.401) (0.353) (0.049) (0.056)
[0.311] [0.741] [0.394] [0.376] [0.150] [0.129]
HR response 46.689 49.511 -1.840 -2.176 10.941 11.609
(0.329) (0.435) (0.176) (0.165) (0.238) (0.220)
[0.370] [0.454] [0.284] [0.196] [0.371] [0.358]
Treatment * HR response -65.971 -76.362 2.705 3.651 -15.934 -17.892
(0.520) (0.527) (0.170) (0.089) (0.172) (0.127)
[0.547] [0.555] [0.183] [0.114] [0.261] [0.219]
Constant 17356.296*** 17268.058*** 191.697*** 195.132*** 833.433*** 826.130***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 167 167 167 167 167 167
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6.9: Impact of acute stress and cortisol response on snack consumption
Muffins (g) Apples (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 5.835 6.464 7.305 10.746
(0.358) (0.306) (0.384) (0.275)
[0.407] [0.360] [0.429] [0.309]
Cortisol response -0.103 -0.976 -0.822 -1.676
(0.929) (0.536) (0.788) (0.638)
[0.894] [0.484] [0.703] [0.622]
Treatment * Cortisol response 0.499 1.119 4.965 5.485
(0.818) (0.679) (0.296) (0.302)
[0.802] [0.686] [0.324] [0.310]
Constant 38.065*** 47.129*** 71.700*** 76.794***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6.10: Impact of acute stress and cortisol response on food shopping
Energy (kcal) Saturated fat (g) Sugar (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment -981.277 -770.142 -10.592 -7.157 -83.132 -86.448
(0.098) (0.213) (0.464) (0.663) (0.123) (0.140)
[0.115] [0.255] [0.488] [0.668] [0.144] [0.209]
Cortisol response 293.895** 318.747* 6.523* 6.462* 7.848 7.720
(0.032) (0.078) (0.063) (0.056) (0.261) (0.331)
[0.012] [0.032] [0.007] [0.051] [0.264] [0.300]
Treatment * Cortisol resp. -638.248* -656.673 -1.900 -1.860 -39.755 -39.666
(0.029) (0.064) (0.868) (0.877) (0.056) (0.089)
[0.062] [0.111] [0.884] [0.887] [0.169] [0.165]
Constant 17530.846*** 17419.281*** 211.090*** 206.157*** 785.185*** 792.532***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6.11: Impact of acute stress and emotional eating on snack consumption
Muffins (g) Apples (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 4.206 3.741 -3.238 -1.181
(0.750) (0.786) (0.872) (0.951)
[0.765] [0.787] [0.874] [0.946]
Emotional eating (DEBQ) 4.004 3.589 8.930 8.285
(0.407) (0.460) (0.133) (0.154)
[0.427] [0.594] [0.190] [0.228]
Treatment * Emot. eating 0.132 0.207 1.646 1.898
(0.979) (0.969) (0.837) (0.804)
[0.985] [0.976] [0.842] [0.808]
Constant 28.254** 39.049*** 50.608*** 57.576***
(0.019) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6.12: Impact of acute stress and emotional eating on food shopping
Energy (kcal) Saturated fat (g) Sugar (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 822.685 966.618 -7.719 -3.345 116.061 110.854
(0.689) (0.637) (0.890) (0.952) (0.150) (0.189)
[0.730] [0.679] [0.884] [0.955] [0.137] [0.207]
Emotional eating (DEBQ) 304.946 286.068 -3.375 -3.763 40.935** 41.143**
(0.663) (0.685) (0.853) (0.836) (0.026) (0.024)
[0.714] [0.721] [0.910] [0.832] [0.040] [0.024]
Treatment * Emot. eating -450.344 -420.648 1.121 0.768 -64.217** -64.116**
(0.527) (0.564) (0.958) (0.971) (0.043) (0.043)
[0.555] [0.592] [0.962] [0.979] [0.036] [0.032]
Constant 16380.662*** 16356.524*** 210.767*** 208.913*** 672.988*** 681.088***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6.13: Impact of acute stress and time preferences on snack consumption
Muffins (g) Apples (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 16.018 15.804 8.307 7.581
(0.263) (0.316) (0.470) (0.510)
[0.276] [0.328] [0.462] [0.455]
Patience (general) -1.521 -1.436 -0.671 -1.167
(0.307) (0.300) (0.712) (0.482)
[0.487] [0.439] [0.738] [0.502]
Treatment * Patience (general) 0.838 0.708 0.018 0.260
(0.670) (0.699) (0.996) (0.932)
[0.691] [0.713] [0.996] [0.931]
Patience (health) 1.516 1.566 0.467 0.508
(0.451) (0.407) (0.822) (0.824)
[0.496] [0.514] [0.822] [0.845]
Treatment * Patience (health) -2.708 -2.594 -0.935 -0.546
(0.323) (0.325) (0.794) (0.881)
[0.355] [0.349] [0.778] [0.874]
Constant 38.179*** 47.268*** 73.918*** 82.216***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6.14: Impact of acute stress and time preferences on food shopping
Energy (kcal) Saturated fat (g) Sugar (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 152.480 459.685 2.492 -1.881 10.596 17.966
(0.909) (0.718) (0.925) (0.948) (0.918) (0.866)
[0.905] [0.730] [0.935] [0.928] [0.912] [0.874]
Patience (gen.) -14.767 -12.180 -2.416 -2.991 -1.220 -0.148
(0.929) (0.936) (0.315) (0.245) (0.934) (0.993)
[0.915] [0.938] [0.368] [0.280] [0.933] [0.994]
Treatment * Patience (general) 187.922 195.229 8.161 8.338 0.133 -0.453
(0.525) (0.491) (0.271) (0.276) (0.995) (0.982)
[0.562] [0.485] [0.292] [0.307] [0.994] [0.977]
Patience (health) 254.740 299.108 1.401 0.523 15.983 17.178
(0.151) (0.095) (0.611) (0.865) (0.234) (0.221)
[0.215] [0.185] [0.653] [0.854] [0.407] [0.435]
Treatment * Patience (health) -277.673 -296.092 -9.711* -8.589 -10.605 -11.907
(0.341) (0.300) (0.076) (0.116) (0.560) (0.522)
[0.382] [0.327] [0.090] [0.165] [0.583] [0.566]
Constant 15792.446*** 15476.369*** 207.985*** 212.565*** 691.892*** 689.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6.15: Impact of acute stress and risk attitudes on snack consumption
Muffins (g) Apples (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment -6.278 -9.112 13.553 17.158
(0.611) (0.396) (0.513) (0.406)
[0.662] [0.414] [0.531] [0.426]
Risk aversion (general) -3.190* -3.134* 1.273 1.217
(0.030) (0.021) (0.318) (0.307)
[0.090] [0.079] [0.330] [0.350]
Treatment * Risk aversion (general) 4.830* 4.788* -2.098 -2.382
(0.046) (0.055) (0.527) (0.528)
[0.071] [0.080] [0.554] [0.554]
Risk aversion (health) 1.603 1.314 -1.754 -2.037
(0.049) (0.108) (0.209) (0.147)
[0.147] [0.235] [0.243] [0.224]
Treatment * Risk aversion (health) -1.285 -0.898 -0.207 -0.081
(0.402) (0.564) (0.951) (0.981)
[0.447] [0.558] [0.945] [0.971]
Constant 41.198*** 52.899*** 78.563*** 86.287***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 3.6.16: Impact of acute stress and risk attitudes on food shopping
Energy (kcal) Saturated fat (g) Sugar (g)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment 368.281 743.754 -65.422 -63.875 -21.147 -31.241
(0.844) (0.684) (0.112) (0.096) (0.793) (0.681)
[0.847] [0.700] [0.138] [0.131] [0.831] [0.667]
Risk aversion (general) 217.069 234.869 -7.182 -6.620 -9.632 -9.374
(0.063) (0.044) (0.264) (0.299) (0.403) (0.437)
[0.156] [0.106] [0.336] [0.334] [0.447] [0.446]
Treatment * Risk aversion (general) -656.131** -696.041** 8.479 7.379 -18.285 -17.789
(0.032) (0.016) (0.242) (0.304) (0.206) (0.203)
[0.036] [0.024] [0.323] [0.334] [0.198] [0.213]
Risk aversion (health) -92.555 -115.876 0.860 0.592 17.671 17.843
(0.542) (0.409) (0.915) (0.941) (0.086) (0.088)
[0.516] [0.426] [0.919] [0.929] [0.170] [0.166]
Treatment * Risk aversion (health) 300.287 306.633 3.816 4.664 5.913 6.277
(0.186) (0.152) (0.652) (0.580) (0.587) (0.551)
[0.214] [0.180] [0.701] [0.617] [0.626] [0.582]
Constant 16831.276*** 16825.043*** 226.297*** 223.548*** 703.596*** 709.320***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls for:
Session time No Yes No Yes No Yes
Time since food/drink No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 196 196 196 196 196 196
Notes: P-values based on standard errors clustered at the session level are shown in
parentheses. P-values based on a wild bootstrap clustered at the session level are shown in
brackets. Significance levels correspond to the largest p-value obtained from both methods
and are indicated as follows: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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